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Overcoming Structural Barriers to Integrated Housing:
A Back–to–the–Future Reflection on the Fair Housing 
Act’s “Affirmatively Further” Mandate
Robert G. Schwemm1
“For as long as there is residential segregation, there will be de 
facto segregation in every area of life. So the challenge is here to 
develop an action program.”
– Martin Luther King, Jr. (1963)2
Introduction
A key goal of the 1968 Fair Housing Act (“FHA”),3 which was passed as an immediate response to Dr. King’s assassination,4 was to replace 
the ghettos with “truly integrated and balanced living patterns.”5 It 
hasn’t happened. Today, more than four decades after the FHA’s passage, 
“residential segregation remains a key feature of America’s urban 
landscape,”6 continuing to condemn new generations of minorities to a 
second–class set of opportunities and undercutting a variety of national 
goals for all citizens.7
But recent developments dealing with an underutilized provision of the 
FHA – § 3608’s mandate that federal housing funds be used “affirmatively 
1 Ashland–Spears Distinguished Research Professor, University of Kentucky College of 
Law. I thank Michael Allen, Rob Breymaier, Sara Pratt, Franklin Runge, and Sarah Welling for 
their ideas and helpful comments on this paper.
2 Martin Luther King, Jr., Speech at Western Michigan University (Dec. 18, 1963), avail-
able at http://www.wmich.edu/library/ archives/mlk/transcription.html.
3 Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90–284, 82 Stat. 73, 81–89 (1968) (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2006)).
4 For a review of the FHA’s history, including the role of Dr. King’s assassination, see 
Robert G. Schwemm, Housing Discrimination: Law and Litigation § 5:2 (2011).
5 114 Cong. Rec. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale). For more on this goal, see 
infra Part I.A–B.
6 Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Racial Segregation and the American Foreclosure Cri-
sis, 75 Am. Soc. Rev. 629, 629 (2010). For more on segregation in the United States, see infra 
Part I.C.1.
7 See infra notes 62–66 and accompanying text.
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to further the [FHA’s] policies”8 – hold out new hope that this law may yet 
prove effective in dismantling segregated housing patterns. These patterns, 
however, are deeply entrenched, and their powerful defenders are already 
mounting a counter–attack. Thus, the ultimate fate of the new § 3608–
based effort to advance residential integration remains to be determined 
– as does resolution of the larger question of whether Americans will ever 
truly embrace the FHA’s goal of an integrated society.
Part I of this Article provides some background, first on the FHA’s 
integration goal, then on the particular mandate of § 3608, and finally on 
the data showing that, despite the FHA, high levels of segregation continue 
to plague the Nation’s housing markets. Part II examines the forty–year 
history of § 3608 from the FHA’s inception through modern times. Part 
III describes a recent § 3608–based lawsuit involving Westchester County, 
New York, the resolution of which in 2009 may start a new era of more 
aggressive enforcement of § 3608. Finally, Part IV reviews post–Westchester 
developments, which have not only produced a number of specific ideas for 
pro–integration initiatives, but also raise the possibility that § 3608’s new 
promise might yet be undermined.
I. The Fair Housing Act’s Unfulfilled Goal of Residential 
Integration
A. The FHA’s Goal of Integration and § 3608’s “Affirmatively Further” 
Mandate
Enacted in 1968, the federal Fair Housing Act9 is a “comprehensive open 
housing law”10 designed to carry out a “policy that Congress considered to 
be of the highest priority.”11 The FHA begins by declaring that “[i]t is the 
policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, 
for fair housing throughout the United States.”12 Then, in language that is 
“broad and inclusive,”13 the statute outlaws a wide range of discriminatory 
housing practices and provides for enforcement through administrative 
8 42 U.S.C. §§ 3608(d), (e)(5) (2006). For a more detailed description of this mandate and 
the history of section 3608, see infra Part I.A–B.
9 Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90–284, 82 Stat. 73, 81–89 (1968) (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2006)).
10 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968).
11 Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972); see also Meyer v. Holley, 
537 U.S. 280, 290 (2003) (agreeing with the lower court that the FHA’s objective is an “overrid‑
ing societal priority”); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380 (1982) (noting “the 
broad remedial intent of Congress embodied in the Act”).
12 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006).
13 Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209; accord City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 
725, 731 (1995).
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proceedings and private and government lawsuits.14 The FHA also 
includes a provision – in a subsection of § 3608 – that directs the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) to administer 
its “programs and activities relating to housing and urban development in 
a manner affirmatively to further the [FHA’s] policies.”15 This mandate to 
“affirmatively further” fair housing (sometimes referred to as “AFFH”) is 
also imposed on all other federal departments and agencies in a separate 
subsection of § 3608.16
The FHA does not define what its policy of “providing for fair housing 
throughout the United States” means, nor what is meant by § 3608’s 
mandate that federal housing programs be administered to “affirmatively 
further” FHA “policies.”17 However, the statute’s legislative history makes 
clear that Congress intended the FHA not only to eliminate housing 
discrimination against minorities, but also to replace segregated living 
patterns with integrated ones.18 The Congress that passed the 1968 FHA 
14 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604–3606, 3617 (2006) (containing the FHA’s substantive prohibitions); 
42 U.S.C. §§ 3610–3614 (2006) (containing the FHA’s enforcement provisions). 
15 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (2006).
16 Id. § 3608(d) (“All executive departments and agencies shall administer their pro‑
grams and activities relating to housing and urban development (including any Federal agen‑
cy having regulatory or supervisory authority over financial institutions) in a manner affirma‑
tively to further the purposes of [the FHA] and shall cooperate with the Secretary [of HUD] 
to further such purposes.”). For cases discussing this provision, see Jorman v. Veterans Admin., 
579 F. Supp. 1407, 1418 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (interpreting § 3608(d) and holding that VA’s mortgage 
program is subject to this provision) and City of Camden v. Plotkin, 466 F. Supp. 44, 53–54 
(D.N.J. 1978) (holding the Census Bureau is not subject to this provision).
17 The AFFH mandate to HUD in § 3608(e)(5) speaks in terms of the FHA’s “policies” 
whereas the AFFH mandate to other departments and agencies in § 3608(d) refers to the 
FHA’s “purposes.” No significance has ever been attached to this difference.
18 Senator Mondale opined that the FHA’s purpose was to replace the ghettos with 
“truly integrated and balancing living patterns.” See 114 Cong. Rec. 3422 (1968).
The Supreme Court quoted this statement by Sen. Mondale, the FHA’s principal sponsor 
in the Senate, in its first FHA decision as evidence of the FHA’s intent. Trafficante, 409 U.S. 
at 211. See generally N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526–27 (1982) (noting that 
statements of the Senator who sponsored the language Congress enacts “are an authoritative 
guide to the statute’s construction”); Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 
548, 564 (1976) (“[A] statement of one of the legislation’s sponsors . . . deserves to be accorded 
substantial weight in interpreting the statute.”). 
Other comments by Senator Mondale attesting to the FHA’s concern for fostering inte‑
grated housing include those which decry the prospect that “we are going to live separately 
in white ghettos and Negro ghettos.” 114 Cong. Rec. 2276 (1968). Senator Mondale believed 
the FHA reflects Congress’s commitment “to the principle of living together” and to promot‑
ing integrated neighborhoods where residents of different races would live together in “har‑
mony.” Id.; see also infra note 20 and accompanying text.
In addition to Senator Mondale’s comments, other proponents of the FHA in both the 
Senate and the House repeatedly argued that it was intended not only to expand housing 
choices for individual minorities, but also to foster racial integration for the benefit of all 
Americans. On the House side, for example, Representative Cellar, Chairman of the House 
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was aware of the recently published conclusion of the National Commission 
on Civil Disorders that the Nation was dividing into two racially separate 
and unequal societies,19 and thus intended the FHA to remedy segregated 
housing patterns and the problems associated with them – segregated 
schools, lost suburban job opportunities for minorities, and the alienation 
of whites and blacks caused by the “lack of experience in actually living 
next” to each other.20
B. § 3608’s Intended Role: Background and Legislative History
Racial segregation in America’s public housing was both illegal and 
pervasive when the 1968 FHA was passed, and the legislative history of § 
3608 shows that it was intended to buttress existing legal resources in order 
to mount a stronger attack on “the widespread problem of segregation 
in public housing.”21 Ever since 1954 when the Supreme Court decided 
Brown v. Board of Education,22 the Constitution had been understood to 
bar government from maintaining racially separate facilities. This mandate 
included public housing authorities, and numerous cases thereafter 
challenged their segregative policies.23 The most famous example was the 
Gautreaux litigation in Chicago, where a court in the 1960s found that the 
Chicago Housing Authority had intentionally chosen building sites and 
assigned tenants based on race to maintain segregation;24 in a companion 
case, HUD’s funding and other support for the CHA’s segregative policies 
were also held unlawful.25
Judiciary Committee, spoke of the need to eliminate the “blight of segregated housing and 
the pale of the ghetto.” 114 Cong. Rec. 9559 (1967). Congressman Ryan saw the FHA as a way 
to help “achieve the aim of an integrated society.” Id. at 9591. According to Senator Javits, the 
intended beneficiaries of the FHA were not only blacks and other minorities groups, but also 
“the whole community.” Id. at 2706.
19 See Schwemm, supra note 4, at 5–4 to –5 (discussing the significance in the FHA’s his‑
tory of the Report of the National Commission on Civil Disorders).
20 Statement of Senator Mondale, 114 Cong. Rec. 2275 (1968). See also Linmark As‑
socs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 94–95 (1977) (noting that in the FHA, Congress 
“made a strong national commitment to promote integrated housing” for the benefit of “both 
whites and blacks”). For more on the integration theme in the FHA’s legislative history, see 
Schwemm, supra note 4, §§ 2:3, 7:3.
21 Clients’ Council v. Pierce, 711 F.2d 1406, 1425 (8th Cir. 1983). 
22 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
23 See, e.g., infra notes 24–25 and accompanying text; see also Heyward v. Pub. Hous. Ad‑
min., 238 F.2d 689, 97‑98 (5th Cir. 1956); Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175, 1178–80 (N.D. Ohio 
1972); Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619, 623 (E.D. La. 1969).
24 See Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Gautreaux v. Chi. 
Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969). For a comprehensive history of the Gautreaux 
litigation by the plaintiff’s principal attorney, see Alexander Polikoff, Waiting for Gau‑
treaux: A Story of Segregation, Housing, and the Black Ghetto (2006). 
25 See Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971) (awarding summary judgment 
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The early 1960s produced other legal tools designed to help challenge 
such segregation. In 1962, President Kennedy issued Executive Order 
11063, which prohibited racial discrimination in federally assisted housing.26 
Two years later in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress banned 
discrimination in all programs and activities that received federal financial 
assistance,27 which included public housing authorities.28 Title VI explicitly 
authorized federal agencies like HUD to cut off funding to entities whose 
programs or activities engaged in racial discrimination.29 
Despite these laws and cases like Gautreaux, public housing remained 
heavily segregated in 1968.30 Against this background, the Congress that 
passed the FHA sought not only to ban housing discrimination, but also, by 
the inclusion of § 3608, to require HUD and other federal agencies to adopt 
a more aggressive approach to ending segregation in federally assisted 
housing. In debates on the FHA, Senator Brooke, one of the law’s principal 
sponsors, pointed out that “an overwhelming proportion of public housing 
. . . directly built, financed and supervised by the Federal Government – is 
racially segregated[,]”31 which meant that “our Government, unfortunately, 
has been sanctioning discrimination in housing throughout this Nation.”32 
Senator Brooke concluded that Title VI had not achieved its goal, because 
“[r]arely does HUD withhold funds or defer action in the name of 
desegregation. In fact, if it were not for all the printed guidelines the housing 
agencies have issued since 1964, one would scarcely know a Civil Rights 
to the plaintiffs based on the determination that HUD’s support violated the Constitution 
and Title VI); see also Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976) (addressing the remedial phase 
of this case against HUD).
26 Exec. Order No. 11,063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,527 (Nov. 24, 1962), reprinted as amended in 
notes for 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2006).
27 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006).
28 See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 1971) (applying the same 
Title VI standard in evaluating HUD’s conduct as applies to local housing authority); see also 
Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 503 F.2d 1236, 1246–47 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding that because 
HUD officials were aware of the discriminatory impact of the housing plan they had approved, 
HUD was also responsible for city’s violation of Title VI).
While Executive Order 11,063 and Title VI clearly covered public housing, they did not 
explicitly provide for a private right of action, although the Supreme Court eventually rec‑
ognized such a right under Title VI, at least for intentional discrimination. See Alexander v. 
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279–80 (2001) (noting that “private individuals may sue to enforce § 
601 of Title VI” and that § 601 “prohibits only intentional discrimination”); see also Montgom‑
ery Imp. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 645 F.2d 291, 293, 295–97 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(recognizing a private right of action under Title VI in the context of a challenge to HUD’s 
funding decisions).
29 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–1 (2006).
30 See, e.g., R. Allen Hays, The Federal Government and Urban Housing: Ideology 
and Change in Public Policy 132–33 (2d ed. 1995).
31 114 Cong. Rec. 2528 (1968).
32 Id. at 2281.
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Act had been passed.”33 Senator Mondale also addressed government’s role 
in maintaining racial segregation in housing:
Negroes who live in slum ghettos . . . have been unable to move to 
suburban communities and other exclusively White areas. In part, 
this inability stems from a refusal by suburbs and other communities 
to accept low–income housing. . . . An important factor contributing to 
exclusion of Negroes from such areas, moreover, has been the policies 
and practices of agencies of government at all levels.34
The FHA, according to Senator Mondale, was needed because of the
sordid story of . . . the immediate post World War II era, during which the 
[Federal Housing Administration], the VA, and other Federal agencies 
encouraged, assisted, and made easy the flight of white people from the 
central cities of white America, leaving behind only the Negroes and 
others unable to take advantage of these liberalized extensions of credits 
and credit guarantees. . . . The record of the U.S. Government in that 
period is one, at best, of covert collaborator in policies which established 
the present outrageous and heartbreaking racial living patterns which 
lie at the core of the tragedy of the American city and the alienation of 
good people from good people because of the utter irrelevancy of color.35
C. Residential Segregation Continues
1. Data from the Decanal Censuses.—By the time the 1968 FHA was 
passed, high levels of racial segregation in America’s housing had become 
entrenched as a result of a half–century of explicitly discriminatory policies 
by both private and public entities (e.g., racial zoning, restrictive covenants, 
public housing policies, urban renewal, and federal mortgage programs).36 
33 Id. at 2527‑28. Senator Brooke also noted:
What adds to the murk is officialdom’s apparent belief in its own sincerity. 
Today’s Federal housing official commonly inveighs against the evils of ghetto 
life even as he pushes buttons that ratify their triumph – even as he ok’s public 
housing sites in the heart of Negro slums, releases planning and urban renewal 
funds to cities dead‑set against integration, and approves the financing of subur‑
ban subdivisions from which Negroes will be barred. These and similar acts are 
committed daily by officials who say they are unalterably opposed to segregation, 
and have the memos to prove it. . . . But when you ask one of these gentlemen 
why, despite the 1962 fair housing Order, most public housing is still segregated, 
he invariably blames it on regional custom, local traditions, personal prejudices of 
municipal housing officials.
Id. at 2281. 
34 Id. at 2277.
35 Id. at 2278.
36  For a historical review of this segregation and its causes in 1900–1970, see Douglas 
S. Massey, Origins of Economic Disparities: The Historical Role of Housing Segregation, in Segrega‑
tion: The Rising Costs for America 39 (James H. Carr & Nandinee K. Kutty eds., 2008); 
see also Schwemm, supra note 4, §§ 3:2–:4 (describing racial zoning, restrictive covenants, and 
discrimination in public housing during this time). 
Prior to the beginning of the twentieth century, race–based practices designed to impose 
residential segregation were virtually unknown, and the levels of black–white segregation 
were “not terribly different from those observed for European immigrant groups in the same 
period.”  Massey,  supra, at 43;  see also  Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, American 
Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass 17, 30–31 (1993) (“[B]efore 
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Despite the FHA’s integration goal and over four decades of housing 
markets operating under the FHA’s ban on discrimination, race–based 
residential segregation remains high, with only modest declines shown in 
each decanal census from 1970 through 2010.37 In addition, segregation 
between whites and Hispanics – the Nation’s fastest growing and now 
largest minority group – has remained virtually unchanged during much 
of this period.38 All this has occurred even as racial and national origin 
minorities became a larger part of the U.S. population and are now projected 
to become the “majority” by mid–century.39
Segregation in particular communities is commonly measured on a 100–
point “dissimilarity” index, with 100 indicating total segregation (i.e., all 
blacks and all whites live in separate areas) and zero indicating a population 
that is randomly distributed by race.40 A score above 60 is considered highly 
segregated.41 Using this measure, the overall segregation index for the 
Nation’s largest metropolitan areas, which account for the great majority of 
the black population,42 was 79 in 1970; 73 in 1980; 67 in 1990; 64 in 2000; 
and 59 in 2010.43 
1900, . . . blacks and whites lived side by side. . . . [L]evels of residential segregation between 
blacks and whites began a steady rise at the turn of the century that would last for sixty years 
. . . . [L]evels of racial isolation in northern cities began to move sharply upward after 1900, 
and especially after 1910.”). 
Black–white segregation and black–isolation levels in major U.S. cities had become ex‑
tremely high by 1940 and remained so through the1960s. See Massey, supra, at 42, 44, 65–66 
(providing charts reflecting such levels from 1900 through 1970). 
37 See John R. Logan & Brian J. Stults, The Persistence of Segregation in the Me‑
tropolis: New Findings from the 2010 Census 2 (2011), available at http://www.s4.brown.
edu/us2010/Data/Report/report2.pdf; Barrett A. Lee et al., Beyond the Census Tract: Patterns and 
Determinants of Racial Segregation at Multiple Geographic Scales, 73 Am. Soc. Rev. 766, 768 (2008); 
see also Rugh & Massey, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
38 See Brookings Inst., State of Metropolitan America: On the Front Lines of 
Demographic Transformation 52 (2010), available at http://www.brookings.edu/metro/
StateOfMetroAmerica.aspx [hereinafter Demographic Transformation]. 
At the time of the 2010 census, the overall U.S. population was 308.7 million, of whom 
16.3% were Hispanics and 12.6% were African–Americans. Karen R. Humes et al., U.S. Cen‑
sus Bureau, Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin: 2010 4 (2010), available at http://www.
census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br–02.pdf. As in the census, this Article uses “black” 
and “African–American” interchangeably. See id. at 2–3. 
39 See Demographic Transformation, supra note 38, at 51–52 (“[C]ontinued faster 
growth of Hispanic, Asian, and black populations [will] put the country as a whole on track to 
reach ‘majority minority’ status by 2042.”).
40 See Massey & Denton, supra note 36, at 20.
41 Id.
42 See Demographic Transformation, supra note 38, at 51 (“More than three–quarters of 
racial and ethnic minorities today live in the nation’s 100 largest metro areas”).
43 Logan & Stults, supra note 37, at 4. The comparable figures for Hispanics were 50 in 
1980; 50 in 1990; and 51 in 2000. Id. at 11. 
As of 2010, one demographer commented that “[w]hen we measure the level of segre‑
gation of Hispanics and Asians, there’s really been no change since 1980.” Morning Edition: 
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The degree of segregation varies substantially among cities and different 
regions of the country, with the highest segregation generally occurring in 
urban areas in the East and Midwest. In 2000, for example, twelve cities 
– including New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C. – 
continued to have a black–white dissimilarity index of over 80.44 As for 
Hispanic–white segregation, many major cities – including New York, Los 
Angeles, Chicago, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Dallas, Houston, and Milwaukee 
– had dissimilarity indices in the 60–70 range.45 
Another noteworthy fact is that minorities have increasingly moved to 
suburban areas during the past two decades.46 This does not necessarily 
result in more integration, however, because many of these minorities have 
simply “re–segregated in separate communities within the suburbs.”47 
In the 1990s, the continuing grip of segregation produced a classic 
commentary dramatically entitled American Apartheid, which concluded 
that racial segregation is “the principal organizational feature of American 
society that is responsible for the creation of the urban underclass” and that 
the “urban ghetto . . . represents the key institutional arrangement ensuring 
the continued subordination of blacks in the United States.”48 Little has 
changed since then. By 2009, 75% of all blacks still lived in only 16% of 
the Census Block Groups, and 50% lived in Census Bock Groups that had 
a combined black and Hispanic population of 67%.49 The 2010 census data 
Segregation in America: “Dragging On and On” (NPR radio broadcast Feb. 18, 2011), available 
at http://www.npr.org/2011/02/18/133848837/ segregation–in–america–dragging–on–and–on 
(quoting John Logan, Brown Univ.). 
44 William H. Fray & Dowell Myers, Racial Segregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas 
and Cities, 1990–2000: Patterns, Trends, and Explanations 49 (2005). By contrast, many 
western metropolitan areas and cities had indices of less than 40. Id.
In 2010, the ten most segregated cities, in order, were Milwaukee, New York, Chicago, 
Detroit, Cleveland, Buffalo, St. Louis, Cincinnati, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles. Daniel Den‑
vir, The 10 Most Segregated Urban Areas in America, Salon (Mar. 29, 2011, 7:55 AM EDT), http://
www.salon.com/2011/03/29/most_segregated_cities/singleton/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2011).
45 Fray & Myers, supra note 44, at 55. 
46 William H. Frey, Brookings Inst., Melting Pot Suburbs: A Census 2000 Study of 
Suburban Diversity 13 (2001), available at http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/census/frey.
pdf (“Minority suburbanization increased markedly during the 1990s,” with minorities in 
2000 constituting “more than a quarter (27.3 percent) of suburban populations in the nation’s 
largest metropolitan areas, up from 19.3 percent in 1990.”). 
By 2008, a majority of all racial/ethnic groups in major metropolitan areas lived in the 
suburbs. See Demographic Transformation, supra note 38, at 60. For more on the 2010 fig‑
ures, see Demographic Transformation, supra note 38, at 60; see also Sabrina Tavernise & 
Robert Gebeloff, Immigrants Make Paths to Suburbia, Not Cities, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 2010, at 
A13 (evaluating the census data and concluding that majority of immigrants moved to sub‑
urbs, not cities).
47 See Frey, supra note 46, at 13.
48 Massey & Denton, supra note 36, at 9, 18.
49 Sydney Beveridge, Customized Social Explorer Maps Illustrate Segregation for Remapping 
Debate Feature, Soc. Explorer, Jan. 19, 2011, available at http://www.socialexplorer.com/pub/
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confirms that “the United States is still a residentially segregated society.”50 
Commenting on the slow pace of change revealed by the 2010 census, one 
demographer noted: “If we take the current rate of change and extend it 
over 50 years, blacks then would be as segregated as Hispanics are today. 
And Hispanics are not exactly fully integrated into the society. Now that’s 
. . . my grandchildren’s lifetime that we’re talking about, and that seems 
very, very slow.”51 Other commentators have reached similar conclusions 
regarding the persistent and seemingly intractable nature of modern 
American residential segregation.52
2. Segregation: Causes and Consequences.—What accounts for segregation’s 
continuing grip, over four decades after the FHA outlawed race–based 
discrimination in housing? A number of factors seem to be at play.53 One is 
economics. Whites generally have more money than minorities and therefore 
can afford to live in a wider range of communities, especially those with 
higher priced housing.54 In addition, many whites have a stronger preference 
than minorities for predominantly white neighborhoods as opposed to 
integrated neighborhoods, and the groups’ respective willingness to pay 
more for houses in their preferred areas tends to perpetuate segregation.55
blog/?p=643. For commentaries on the 2000 figures, see Margery Austin Turner, Limits on 
Housing and Neighborhood Choice: Discrimination and Segregation in U.S. Housing Markets, 41 Ind. 
L. Rev. 797, 799–801 (2008).
50 Craig Gurian, New Maps Show Segregation Alive and Well, Remapping Debate, Apr. 20, 
2011, http://www.remappingdebate.org/map–data–tool/new–maps–show–segregation–alive–
and–well (quoting William H. Frey, Senior Fellow with the Metropolitan Policy Program at 
Brookings Institution). 
51 Segregation in America: “Dragging On and On,” supra note 43. For more on Professor 
Logan’s analysis of the 2010 figures, see Logan & Stults, supra note 37. 
52 See, e.g., Florence Wagman Roisman, Keeping the Promise: Ending Racial Discrimina-
tion and Segregation in Federally Financed Housing, 48 How. L.J. 913, 916 (2005) (“[T]he 2000 
Census demonstrated that, while residential racial segregation of Blacks has been declining 
slightly, it still is at such high levels that if it continued to decline at the same rate, it would 
be decades before a moderate level of segregation were reached.”); see also Abraham Bell & 
Gideon Parchomovsky, The Integration Game, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1965, 1975 (2000) (conclud‑
ing with respect to housing segregation that “the magnitude of the problem has remained 
relatively static over the last half century”).
53 See, e.g., James H. Carr & Nandinee K. Kutty, Segregation: The Rising Costs for 
America 263–71 (2008); see also Lee, supra note 37 (creating a new approach to determine and 
predict racial segregation). 
54 See Paul Taylor et al., Wealth Gaps Rise to Record Highs Between Whites, 
Blacks and Hispanics 1–2 (2011) (“The median wealth of white households is 20 times that 
of black households and 18 times that of Hispanic households,” and “about a third of black 
(35%) and Hispanic (31%) households had zero or negative net worth in 2009, compared 
with 15% of white households.”), available at http://pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/07/SDT–
Wealth–Report_7–26–11_FINAL.pdf.
55 See Massey & Denton, supra note 36, at 95–96 (“[C]ontrasting attitudes of blacks and 
whites create a huge disparity in the demand for housing in racially mixed neighborhoods” 
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Another cause of segregation is housing discrimination against racial 
minorities, which remains at a discouragingly high rate despite the FHA. 
National testing studies show that white home–seekers are favored over 
their black and Hispanic counterparts about 20% of the time in rental and 
sales situations.56 A common form of such discrimination is “racial steering,” 
which involves directing home–seekers of different races to different areas 
and whose obvious effect is to perpetuate segregation.57 Each year, tens of 
thousands of FHA complaints are filed,58 and these complaints represent 
“only a fraction of instances of housing discrimination” that actually occur 
and “small differences in racial tolerances between blacks and whites can lead to a high de‑
gree of residential segregation.”). 
Such preferences may, of course, change over time. For example, black preferences for 
integrated as opposed to heavily black neighborhoods may have waned in recent years. See 
Sheryll Cashin, The Failures of Integration: How Race and Class Are Undermining the 
American Dream XII (2004) (opining that blacks “have become integration weary”); cf. Casey 
J. Dawkins, Recent Evidence on the Continuing Causes of Black–White Residential Segregation, 26 J. 
Urb. Aff. 379, 396 (2004) (summarizing evidence that black choice is a relatively small part of 
the explanation for residential segregation).
56 See Margery Austin Turner et al., Discrimination in Metropolitan Housing 
Markets: National Results from Phase I HDS 2000 iii–iv (2002) (reporting, based on a 2000 
nationwide testing program, that whites were favored over blacks 21.6% of the time in rental 
tests and 17.0% in sales tests and over Hispanics 25.7% of the time in rental tests and 19.7% in 
sales tests), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/Phase1_Report.pdf.
Race–based mortgage and home–insurance discrimination is also widespread. See, e.g., 
Robert G. Schwemm & Jeffrey L. Taren, Discretionary Pricing, Mortgage Discrimination, and the 
Fair Housing Act, 45 Harv. C.R.–C.L. L. Rev. 375, 385–95 (2010) (discussing mortgage discrim‑
ination); Insurance Redlining: Disinvestment, Reinvestment, and the Evolving Role of 
Financial Institutions (Gregory D. Squires ed., 1997) (discussing insurance discrimination).
57 See Turner et al., supra note 56, at 6–6 (reporting, based on a 2000 national test‑
ing study, that “[w]hite and black homebuyers were consistently steered to neighborhoods 
(census tracts) that promoted or perpetuated segregation”); see also John Yinger, Closed 
Doors, Opportunities Lost: The Continuing Costs of Housing Discrimination 51–61 
(1995) (discussing the results of an earlier national testing study of steering). According to the 
Supreme Court, 
[Racial steering is the] practice by which real estate brokers and agents preserve 
and encourage patterns of racial segregation in available housing by steering mem‑
bers of racial and ethnic groups to buildings occupied primarily by members of 
such racial and ethnic groups and away from buildings and neighborhoods inhab‑
ited primarily by members of other races or groups.
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 366 & n.1 (1982).
58 U.S. Dept. of Hous. & Urb. Dev., Live Free: Annual Report on Fair Hous‑
ing FY2010, 19 (2011), available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/
huddoc?id=ANNUALREPORT2010.PDF (reporting that over 10,000 FHA complaints 
were filed with HUD and state and local fair housing agencies in each of the last four fis‑
cal years); National Fair Housing Alliance, A Step in the Right Direction: 2010 Fair 
Housing Trends Report 20 (2010) [hereinafter Trends Report] (reporting that private 
fair housing groups received 20,173 and 19,924 complaints in, respectively, 2008 and 2009), 
available at http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=APout1nxpwg% 
3d&tabid=3917&mid=5321.
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annually,59 which is estimated to be about 4,000,000.60
The economic/attitudinal causes of segregation and on–going 
discrimination reinforce one another. As one noted expert has observed, 
“segregation is not simply an incidental outcome of the discriminatory 
system but is, in fact, a key reason why discrimination is so hard to eliminate 
– an outcome that becomes a cause.”61
Whatever the causes, the perpetuation of residential segregation has 
had devastating consequences. Racial minorities confined to ghetto–
like enclaves suffer from reduced educational, employment, financial, 
and other opportunities and are exposed to greater levels of crime and 
disease.62 Whites suffer as well,63 in part because segregation reinforces 
their negative stereotypes of minorities, leading many to move to ever 
more remote and expensive areas to avoid having minority neighbors.64 
Residential segregation undermines national unity, dictating that racial 
divisions continue to characterize virtually every area of American life.65 
Nor are its costs merely intangible; from a purely financial standpoint, 
housing discrimination and segregation cost individuals billions of dollars 
every year.66 
3. Continuing Governmental Discrimination and the Failed Promise of § 3608.—
As the proponents of the 1968 FHA recognized, race–based housing 
59 U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., The State of Fair Housing: FY 2008 Annual 
Report on Fair Housing 2 (2009), available at http://www.hud.gov/content/releases/
fy2008annual–rpt.pdf.
60 Trends Report, supra note 58, at 20.
61 Yinger, supra note 57, at 214.
62 See, e.g., Cashin, supra note 55, at 127–66, 202–60; Massey & Denton, supra note 36, at 
148–85; Yinger, supra note 57 at 135–58; Nancy A. Denton, The Role of Residential Segregation 
in Promoting and Maintaining Inequality in Wealth and Property, 34 Ind. L. Rev. 1199, 1205–09 
(2001). 
Generally, “racial housing patterns correlate[] closely with patterns of school quality, em‑
ployment opportunities, infrastructure investment, and health quality among other opportu‑
nity and quality–of–life factors.” James Robert Breymaier, The Need to Prioritize the Affirmative 
Furthering of Fair Housing: A Case Statement, 57 Clev. St. L. Rev. 245, 245 (2009) (citing Paul 
Finkelman, Civil Rights in Historical Context: In Defense of Brown, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 973, 1007 
(2005) (reviewing Michael J. Kalarman, Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and 
the Struggle for Racial Equality (2004)). 
63 See, e.g., Breymaier, supra note 62, at 252 (“[Segregated housing patterns] are harmful 
to everyone. Promoting integrated communities would stimulate positive changes to improve 
affordable housing dispersion, balanced economic development, equitable school improve‑
ment, and sustainable growth patterns.” (citing Chiquita Collins & David Williams, Segregation 
and Mortality, 14 Soc. F. 495, 497–500 (1999))).
64 See, e.g., Cashin, supra note 55, at 167–201, 251–52.
65 See, e.g., Elizabeth Anderson, The Imperative of Integration 2 (2010); Orlando Pat‑
terson, Inequality in America and What to Do about It, The Nation, July 19/26, 2010, at 18. 
66 See Yinger, supra note 57, at 103 (calculating in 1995 that the direct “cost imposed 
on blacks and Hispanics by current housing discrimination comes to $4.1 billion per year”).
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discrimination by government at all levels was a major contributing factor 
to residential segregation,67 and this has continued up to the present day. 
Throughout the FHA’s history, a large portion of its cases has involved local 
governments, which have been accused of various discriminatory practices 
whose purpose or effect restricted minority housing opportunities. These 
practices include enforcing building codes more aggressively against 
minority–occupied housing;68 providing inferior municipal services 
to minority neighborhoods;69 giving preferences to local residents in 
predominantly white towns for subsidized housing and other housing 
benefits;70 and, perhaps the most common of all, employing zoning and 
other land–use techniques to block or limit the location of affordable 
housing developments.71 This technique has been particularly effective in 
maintaining segregation, because demographics in most metropolitan areas 
mean that, as the Eighth Circuit recently observed, “it is reasonable to infer 
racial minorities, particularly African–Americans, [are] disproportionately 
affected by” municipal action that limits “the overall amount of affordable 
housing.”72
Many of these local governments have regularly received HUD grants 
and are therefore subject to § 3608’s “affirmatively further” mandate. At 
the very least, therefore, these government–grantees should have been 
expected to curb their policies and practices that reinforce segregation. 
Indeed, as we shall see later, § 3608 and its implementing regulations 
require such grantees not only to guard against their own discriminatory 
actions, but also to identify discrimination by others within their jurisdiction 
and to devise action plans to eliminate such discrimination.73 Clearly, based 
on the current state of race–based housing discrimination and residential 
segregation as described in the previous section, the promise made by § 
3608 has yet to be realized.
 
II. Forty Years of § 3608 Law
A. 1968–1988: Early Court Decisions Interpreting § 3608
67 See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text.
68 See Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 828–29, 833–38 (8th Cir. 2010), petition for reh’g 
and reh’g en banc denied, 636 F.3d 380 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011); Hispan‑
ics United of DuPage Cnty. v. Vill. of Addison, 988 F. Supp. 1130, 1141–43 (N.D. Ill. 1997). 
69 See Schwemm, supra note 4, § 14:3 nn.36–37 (citing FHA cases involving discrimina‑
tory municipal services). 
70 See Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 234 F. Supp. 2d 33, 43, 69–70 (D. Mass. 2002); 
United States v. Hous. Auth. of Chickasaw, 504 F. Supp. 716, 717–18, 729–32 (S.D. Ala. 1980). 
71 See Schwemm, supra note 4, §§ 11D:5, 12B:5, 13:8 to :10.
72 Gallagher, 619 F.3d at 835. 
73 See infra Part II.C.2.
        Furthering Integrated Housing 1372011– 2012]
Early judicial commentaries on § 3608 confirmed that this provision 
was intended to generate forceful pro–integration action by HUD and 
those entities to which HUD extended financial assistance.74 In the FHA’s 
first two decades, some of these cases yielded appellate decisions that 
established important principles about § 3608, four of which are described 
in this section. 
The first appellate decision involving § 3608 was in 1970 in Shannon 
v. HUD,75 where the Third Circuit upheld a challenge to HUD’s financial 
support of a public housing project in a minority area of Philadelphia 
that local residents claimed would increase racial concentration in their 
neighborhood.76 The Shannon decision held that HUD could not finance 
this project consistent with § 3608, Title VI, and other applicable laws unless 
it first considered the project’s impact on racial segregation in the area.77 
The Third Circuit recognized that HUD had a good deal of discretion in 
determining what housing projects to fund and how its funding decisions 
are made, but the court held that “that discretion must be exercised within 
the framework of the national policy against discrimination in federally 
assisted housing . . . [citing Title VI], and in favor of fair housing [citing the 
FHA].”78 Indeed, with respect to HUD’s duties under § 3608, the appellate 
court held that the absence of evidence of discrimination in locating the 
funded project here was “irrelevant,”79 noting that under the FHA:
more is required of HUD than a determination that some rent 
supplement housing is located outside ghetto areas. . . . Possibly before 
1964 the administrators of the federal housing programs could, by 
concentrating on land use controls, building code enforcement, and 
74 In addition to the appellate decisions discussed in the remainder of this section, see 
Young v. Pierce, 544 F. Supp. 1010, 1017 (E.D. Tex. 1982) (noting that the FHA is not as lim‑
ited as Title VI regarding “the enforcement powers of funding agencies acting to further the 
fundamental principles set forth therein” and that the scope of the FHA “is majestic, and its 
enforcement provisions are commensurately broad”).
75 Shannon v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970).
76 Id. at 811–12.
77 Id. at 821. According to the Shannon opinion:
Read together, the Housing Act of 1949 and the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 
1968 [§ 3608] show a progression in the thinking of Congress as to what factors 
significantly contributed to urban blight and what steps must be taken to reverse 
the trend or to prevent the recurrence of such blight. In 1949 the Secretary, in ex‑
amining whether a plan presented by a [Local Public Agency] included a workable 
program for community improvement, could not act unconstitutionally, but pos‑
sibly could act neutrally on the issue of racial segregation. By 1964 he was directed, 
when considering whether a program of community development was workable, 
to look at the effects of local planning action and to prevent discrimination in 
housing resulting from such action. In 1968 he was directed to act affirmatively to 
achieve fair housing. Whatever were the most significant features of a workable 
program for community improvement in 1949, by 1964 such a program had to be 
nondiscriminatory in its effects, and by 1968 the Secretary had to affirmatively 
promote fair housing.
Id. at 816.
78 Id. at 819.
79 Id. at 820.
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physical conditions of buildings, remain blind to the very real effect that 
racial concentration has had in the development of urban blight. Today 
such color blindness is impermissible. Increase or maintenance of racial 
concentration is prima facie likely to lead to urban blight and is thus 
prima facie at variance with the national housing policy.80
Shannon also held that the local–resident plaintiffs had standing to 
challenge HUD’s flawed decision–making in this case.81 One problem was 
that the plaintiffs did not – and indeed could not – sue under the FHA’s 
private enforcement provisions, which cover the statute’s basic substantive 
provisions but not § 3608.82 Shannon held, however, that as for suits seeking 
to enforce § 3608’s affirmative duties, “judicial review of [HUD’s] actions is 
available” pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act.83
The Shannon decision provided a key building block for establishing 
the proposition, later endorsed by other appellate courts and the Supreme 
Court, that the FHA in general and § 3608 in particular were intended 
to promote not just nondiscrimination against individual minorities, 
but racial integration for the benefit of entire communities.84 Shannon 
also led to the filing of many other cases that challenged HUD funding 
decisions regarding particular housing projects;85 some similar cases, like 
80 Id. at 820–21.
81 Id. at 817.
82 See id. at 820. Then, as now, the FHA’s private complaint and enforcement proce‑
dures, while governing claims based on violations of the statute’s substantive provisions in §§ 
3604–3606, “do not pertain to the [HUD] Secretary’s affirmative duties under [§ 3608 ].” Id.; 
see also 42 U.S.C. § 3602(f) (2006) (defining “discriminatory housing practice” under the FHA 
to include violations of §§ 3604–3606 and 3617, but not § 3608, which triggers the statute’s pri‑
vate enforcement provisions under 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i) for administrative complaints 
to HUD and 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) for private lawsuits).
83 Shannon, 436 F.2d at 820; see also id. at 818–19 (describing review of such a claim under 
the Administrative Procedure Act pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 702). 
Subsequent appellate decisions agreed that § 3608–based challenges to HUD’s funding 
decisions may be reviewed pursuant to the APA. See, e.g., NAACP, Bos. Chapter v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 157, 161 (1st Cir. 1987); Montgomery Improvement 
Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 645 F.2d 291, 292–93 (5th Cir. 1981); Davis 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 627 F.2d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 1980); infra note 113 and ac‑
companying text. 
84 The Supreme Court’s first FHA decision, handed down in 1972, cited Shannon with 
approval and determined that the FHA’s purpose was to replace the ghettos with “truly in‑
tegrated and balanced living patterns.” Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 
(1972). Other early § 3608 decisions endorsed this proposition. See, e.g., Clients’ Council v. 
Pierce, 711 F.2d 1406, 1425 (8th Cir. 1983); Alschuler v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 
686 F.2d 472, 482 (7th Cir. 1982); Jorman v. Veterans Admin., 579 F. Supp. 1407, 1418 (N.D. 
Ill. 1984); Young v. Pierce, 544 F. Supp. 1010, 1017–18 (E.D. Tex. 1982); Schmidt v. Bos. Hous. 
Auth., 505 F. Supp. 988, 996–97 (D. Mass. 1981); Blackshear Residents Org. v. Hous. Auth. of 
Austin, 347 F. Supp. 1138, 1146 (W.D. Tex. 1972). For more on the FHA’s goal of integration, 
see supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text. 
85 See, e.g., Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 503 F.2d 1236, 1247 (6th Cir. 1974); Graves v. 
Romney, 502 F.2d 1062, 1062 (8th Cir. 1974); Jones v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 390 
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the Gautreaux litigation, had preceded Shannon and were based on other 
theories,86 but Shannon provided them and future cases with an additional 
legal tool in § 3608. Eventually, Shannon and similar cases prompted HUD 
to adopt new regulations dealing with its housing funding decisions that 
were designed both to make sure HUD is informed in advance about the 
segregative impact of these decisions and to avoid as far as possible funding 
decisions that would add to racial concentration.87 
Three years after Shannon, many of its views about § 3608 were 
endorsed by the Second Circuit in Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, 
a case that dealt with how the defendant Authority should select tenants 
for two of its new apartment projects.88 These projects, which were funded 
by HUD, were built in an area whose racial makeup was changing from 
white to minority, and many minority families had been relocated to make 
way for the new buildings.89 These relocated families were promised first 
priority for units in the new projects, but the Authority later reneged on this 
promise in favor of some white families in order to avoid increasing minority 
concentration in the area. The displaced families sued, but the Second 
Circuit upheld the Authority’s position, holding that it was obligated, based 
on § 3608, “to take affirmative steps to promote racial integration even 
though this may in some instances not operate to the immediate advantage 
of some non–white persons.”90 According to Otero, HUD’s duties under § 
3608, which the Second Circuit assumed also applied to HUD grantees like 
the Authority,91 meant that: 
F. Supp. 579, 590 (E.D. La. 1974); Blackshear Residents Org., 347 F. Supp. at 11145–49.
86 See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text; see also Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175 
(N.D. Ohio 1972) (enjoining Cleveland officials, based on their constitutional violations, from 
locating future public housing projects in minority neighborhoods). 
87 See Schwemm, supra note 4, 21–13 to –14. This is not to say that Shannon–type issues 
have wholly abated. For example, in 2005, despite one commentator opining that the idea that 
HUD “should no longer be permitted to routinely build new low–income housing in segre‑
gated, high–poverty neighborhoods” was a point “won” decades ago, Philip D. Tegeler, The 
Persistence of Segregation in Government Housing Programs, in The Geography of Opportunity: 
Race and Housing Choice in Metropolitan America 197, 197 (Xavier de Souza Briggs ed., 
2005), a federal judge held HUD liable for doing this very thing in the Baltimore area through‑
out the prior three decades. Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 348 F. Supp. 2d 
398, 524 (D. Md. 2005). For more on this case, see Florence Wagman Roisman, Affirmatively 
Furthering Fair Housing in Regional Housing Markets: The Baltimore Public Housing Desegregation 
Litigation, 42 Wake Forest L. Rev. 333, 353 (2007).
88 Otero v. Park City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1124 (2d Cir. 1973).
89 See id. at 1125–29.
90 Id. at 1124–25; see also id. at 1133 (citing § 3608 as a key source for the Authority’s 
“obligation to act affirmatively to achieve integration in housing”).
91 A number of other courts agreed. See, e.g., Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 503 F.2d 1236, 
1247 (6th Cir. 1974); Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175, 1182 (N.D. Ohio 1972), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part on other grounds, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973); Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382, 
391–92 (N.D. Ga. 1971). Others, however, were not so sure. See, e.g., Resident Advisory Bd. v. 
Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 140 n.18, 146 (3d Cir. 1977) (avoiding the issue and noting some disagree‑
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[C]onsideration [must] be given to the impact of proposed public 
housing programs on the racial concentration in the area in which the 
proposed housing is to be built. Action must be taken to fulfill, as much 
as possible, the goal of open, integrated residential housing patterns and 
to prevent the increase of segregation, in ghettos, of racial groups whose 
lack of opportunities the [Fair Housing] Act was designed to combat.92
Like Otero and Shannon, most early § 3608 cases dealt with the tenant 
selection or siting processes for HUD–assisted public housing.93 Some, 
however, went beyond these scenarios. For example, in Resident Advisory 
Board v. Rizzo,94 the Third Circuit reviewed a district court’s determination 
that HUD and various Philadelphia officials had violated § 3608 by blocking 
construction of a federally subsidized housing project proposed for a white 
area.95 HUD did not appeal,96 but the local defendants did, and the Third 
Circuit, while affirming their liability, chose to base that liability on the 
Constitution and the FHA’s § 3604(a) rather than § 3608.97 Rizzo thus 
became one of a number of appellate decisions in the 1970s dealing with 
challenges to exclusionary zoning and other municipal land–use practices 
that generally relied on the FHA’s substantive prohibitions in § 3604 rather 
than § 3608.98
The last of the significant early § 3608 decisions was NAACP, Boston 
Chapter v. HUD [hereinafter Boston],99 a case that grew out of a challenge 
ment in post–Otero cases); see also Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Hous. & Urban Dev., 723 F. Supp. 2d 14, 21–24 (D.D.C. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 
on other grounds, 639 F.3d 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that state defendants who received 
HUD funds are not subject to § 3608 after upholding plaintiffs’ § 3604(a) claims against these 
defendants).
In any event, it is now clear that HUD grantees may be required to certify that they are 
affirmatively furthering fair housing as a condition of receiving their grants pursuant to current 
HUD regulations. See infra Part II.C.2; see also Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 234 F. Supp. 
2d 33, 75 (D. Mass. 2002) (holding that public housing agencies must “affirmatively further 
fair housing”).
92 Otero, 484 F.2d at 1134.
93 See supra notes 24–25, 86.
94 Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977).
95 See Rizzo, 425 F. Supp. 987, 1013–21 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 564 
F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977).
96 Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 140.
97 Id. at 140, 145–46.
98 In addition to Rizzo, see Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 
F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184–85 
(8th Cir. 1974). For similar decisions after 1980, see NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 
926 (2d Cir. 1988), aff’d per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988); Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 482–84 
(9th Cir. 1988); Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1311 (9th Cir. 1982); Smith v. Town of 
Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562, 
574 (6th Cir. 1981).
99 NAACP, Bos. Chapter v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 
1987) [hereinafter Boston].
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to HUD’s funding activity in Boston, which eventually resulted in a 
1987 opinion by the First Circuit authored by then Judge, now Justice, 
Breyer.100 In this case, the NAACP accused HUD of various failings in the 
“administration of its Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) and 
Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) programs,” which allegedly 
violated “HUD’s duty ‘affirmatively to further’ the Fair Housing Act’s 
policies.”101
The trial in the Boston case showed that that city’s housing was highly 
segregated and that “neither the city nor HUD had sought to obtain or to 
provide UDAG funds for low–income housing,” leading the district court 
to conclude that HUD had violated § 3608 by failing “to use its ‘immense 
leverage under UDAG’ to provide ‘desegregated housing so that the 
100 See id. at 151.
101 Id. The CDBG and UDAG programs were created by the 1974 Housing and Com‑
munity Development Act to provide federal funds to local communities for, respectively, 
housing–related public improvement projects and development in economically distressed 
urban areas. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5317 (2006) (creating the CDBG); 42 U.S.C. § 5318 (2006) 
(creating the UDAG). The CDBG program, which is further discussed infra notes 134–41 and 
accompanying text, has since grown to be a multi–billion–dollar–per–year source of federal 
funds for local communities, while the UDAG program expired after 1988 when Congress no 
longer funded it. See Ingrid W. Reed, The Life and Death of UDAG: An Assessment Based on Eight 
Projects in Five New Jersey Cities, 19 Publius: J. Federalism 93, 93 (1989). 
In addition to the Boston case, other § 3608–based litigation had challenged funding deci‑
sions under these programs. See, e.g., Montgomery Imp. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban 
Dev., 645 F.2d 291, 292–94 (5th Cir. 1981); Davis v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 627 
F.2d 942, 943–45 (9th Cir. 1980) (upholding standing of local residents to challenge CDBG 
grants in an opinion by then Judge, now Justice, Kennedy); Coal. for Block Grant Compli‑
ance v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 450 F. Supp. 43, 52 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (upholding 
standing of Detroit residents who sought to move to suburban Livonia to challenge the lat‑
ter’s HUD grants); cf. City of Hartford v. Towns of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1032, 1033–34, 1040, 
1048 (2d Cir. 1976) (reversing on standing grounds a successful challenge by Hartford and its 
low–income residents to CDBG awards to local suburbs where the individual plaintiffs alleg‑
edly wanted to live).
Some of these cases were brought against suburban communities that had found the pro‑
grams’ AFFH requirements so unpalatable that they had simply withdrawn their applications 
for federal funds. See, e.g., City of Parma, 661 F.2d at 574–75 (determining, in FHA case against 
a Cleveland suburb, that the defendant City’s failure to provide for low–income housing goals 
in its initial CDBG application and its subsequent decision to withdraw that application rather 
than establish such goals were motivated by its desire to exclude low–income persons, includ‑
ing blacks, in violation of the FHA); Angell v. Zinsser, 473 F. Supp. 488, 501–02 (D. Conn. 
1979) (enjoining Hartford suburb, which had previously attempted to withdraw its application 
for a future grant to receive CDBG funds rather than comply with HUD’s directive to take 
additional steps to assure compliance with the program’s fair housing goals, from withdrawing 
its CDBG application based on a showing that the decision to withdraw might well have been 
made for unlawful discriminatory reasons); see also Hope, Inc. v. Cnty. of DuPage, 717 F.2d 
1061, 1069 (7th Cir. 1983), rev’d en banc on other grounds, 738 F.2d 797, 822 (7th Cir. 1984) (iden‑
tifying the fact that the defendant County had rejected a community block grant as evidence 
of its purposeful discrimination against low–income and minority residents); Davis, 627 F.2d 
at 944 (noting defendant City’s threat to forego CDGB funds if it lost the current litigation). 
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housing stock is sufficiently large to give minority families a true choice 
of location.’”102 Later, however, the trial court decided it could not order 
any relief because it lacked “legal authority to review [HUD]’s compliance 
with [§ 3608’s] ‘affirmative furtherance’ mandate,”103 but the First Circuit 
disagreed.
Justice Breyer’s opinion in Boston began by agreeing with the district 
court that § 3608 does not create a private right of action that can be 
enforced directly in court.104 The opinion went on to conclude, however, 
that a § 3608–based claim of this kind could be judicially reviewed under 
the Administrative Procedure Act,105 which meant that a court did have 
authority to order appropriate relief.106
With respect to the merits of the NAACP’s claim, Justice Breyer noted 
that “the right at issue–the right to HUD’s help in achieving open housing–
is a significant one.”107 Furthermore, he rejected HUD’s claim that § 3608 
“imposes upon HUD only an obligation not to discriminate.”108 As Justice 
102 Boston, 817 F.2d at 151. 
103 Id. at 152.
104 Id. at 152–54 (following Latinos Unidos de Chelsea v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban 
Dev., 799 F.2d 774, 791‑93 (1st Cir. 1986)). Subsequent decisions generally agreed. See Greater 
New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 723 F. Supp. 2d 14, 
24 (D.D.C. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 639 F.3d 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2011); 
Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 348 F. Supp. 2d 398, 418 (D. Md. 2005); 
Pleune v. Pierce, 697 F. Supp. 113, 119–20 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Lee v. Pierce, 698 F. Supp. 332, 342 
(D.D.C. 1988); cf. Montgomery Improvement Ass’n., 645 F.2d 291, 293–97 (5th Cir. 1981) (hold‑
ing that a private cause of action exists under the nondiscrimination provisions of the grant 
authorizing statute here (the 1974 Housing and Community Development Act, see supra note 
101) and therefore finding it unnecessary to decide whether such a cause exists under § 3608).
105 Boston, 817 F.2d at 157–60 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), the APA’s provision authoriz‑
ing a court to hold unlawful and set aside agency action found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”). The claim here was seen not 
as focused only on “individual instances” of HUD behavior, but rather as based on “HUD’s 
practice over time, its pattern of behavior, [that] reveals a failure ‘affirmatively . . . to further’ 
[the FHA’s] fair housing policy,” as required by § 3608. Id. at 158.
106 Id. at 160–61 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). HUD argued that the “inaction” it was 
being accused of here was inappropriate for APA review, but Justice Breyer disagreed, con‑
cluding that:
On these facts, we are not sure what difference, if any, there may be between 
HUD’s “failure to exercise” the discretion conferred upon it by § 3608(e)(5) and 
its “abuse” of that discretion as revealed in a pattern of HUD activity. We conclude 
that the court is empowered to order a remedy either for an act or a related omis‑
sion of the sort here present.
Id. at 161.
107 Id. at 157.
108 Id. at 156. That limited obligation, according to Boston, was already imposed by the 
Constitution, whereas the FHA is “a statute that instructs HUD to administer its grant pro‑
grams so as ‘affirmatively to further’ the Act’s fair housing policy[, which] requires something 
more of HUD than simply to refrain from discriminating itself or purposely aiding the dis‑
crimination of others.” Id.
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Breyer wrote:
[The FHA’s] framers meant to do more than simply restate HUD’s 
existing legal obligations. . . . [A]s a matter of language and of logic, 
a statute that instructs an agency “affirmatively to further” a national 
policy of nondiscrimination would seem to impose an obligation to do 
more than simply not discriminate itself. If one assumes that many 
private persons and local governments have practiced discrimination for 
many years and that at least some of them might be tempted to continue 
to discriminate even though forbidden to do so by law, it is difficult to 
see how HUD’s own nondiscrimination by itself could significantly 
“further” the ending of such discrimination by others.109
Thus, the First Circuit held that § 3608 requires HUD to “consider 
[the] effect [of a HUD grant] on the racial and socio–economic composition 
of the surrounding area.”110 If this were done “in any meaningful way, one 
would expect to see, over time, if not in any individual case, HUD activity 
that tends to increase, or at least, that does not significantly diminish, the 
supply of open housing.”111 The Boston opinion did recognize that HUD 
funding decisions were entitled to substantial deference112 and could only 
be set aside under the APA if they amounted to “arbitrary” or “capricious” 
action.113 However, because the district court’s finding seemed to endorse 
the NAACP’s claim “that HUD’s pattern of grant activity in Boston reflects 
a failure, over time, to take seriously its minimal [FHA] obligation to 
evaluate alternative courses of action in light of their effect upon open 
housing[,]” the First Circuit found “the existence of a plausible claim of a 
[FHA] violation.”114
109 Id. The Boston opinion also concluded that: 
[T]he [FHA’s] supporters saw the ending of discrimination as a means toward truly 
opening the nation’s housing stock to persons of every race and creed. . . . This 
broader goal . . . reflects the desire to have HUD use its grant programs to assist in 
ending discrimination and segregation, to the point where the supply of genuinely 
open housing increases.
Id.
110 Id. at 156 (quoting Anderson v. City of Alpharetta, 737 F.2d 1530, 1537 (11th Cir. 
1984)); accord Darst–Webbe Tenant Ass’n Bd. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 339 F.3d 702, 713 (8th 
Cir. 2003). 
In Anderson, the Eleventh Circuit rejected a § 3608 claim against HUD for not doing 
more to counteract “the deliberate foot–dragging of local governments” in failing to construct 
sufficient low–income public housing in the Atlanta suburbs. Anderson, 737 F.2d at 1532. The 
Anderson court held that such “inaction” by HUD did not violate § 3608. Id. at 1537.
111 Boston, 817 F.2d at 156.
112 Id. at 157 (“Clearly, HUD possesses broad discretionary powers to develop, award, 
and administer its grants and to decide the degree to which they can be shaped to help 
achieve [the FHA]’s goals.”). 
113 Id. at 158. Prior decisions had also reviewed § 3608 claims under the APA’s “arbitrary 
or capricious” standard. See cases cited supra note 83.
114 Boston, 817 F.2d. at 157. On remand, the district court did determine that HUD’s 
action violated § 3608 in a sufficiently arbitrary and capricious manner to justify a remedial 
order. See NAACP v. Kemp, 721 F. Supp. 361, 370 (D. Mass. 1989).
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With the First Circuit’s decision in the Boston case, lower–court 
interpretations of § 3608 had established the following propositions: (1) 
HUD’s duties – and by extension those of its grantees – included not 
merely the avoidance of discriminatory action, but the requirement to 
take affirmative steps to achieve racial integration in the particular housing 
markets funded; (2) private enforcement of this mandate could not be done 
through the FHA’s normal enforcement mechanisms nor based on a private 
right of action under § 3608, but only through an APA–based claim;115 and 
(3) because of (2), courts could only set aside HUD actions that were 
determined to be an “arbitrary or capricious” violation of § 3608, and 
such APA–based claims could only result in injunctive relief and not also 
damages or attorney’s fees.116 As the next section shows, these propositions 
were reinforced by Congress in 1988.
 
B. 1988: Amendments to the FHA and New HUD Regulations 
In 1988, Congress passed a major set of amendments to the FHA, known 
as the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA).117 The FHAA 
made extensive changes to the FHA, including adding “familial status” 
and “handicap” to the bases of forbidden discrimination in the statute’s 
115 Whether a private action to enforce § 3608’s mandates can be brought under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 had not been authoritatively determined at this time. See Price v. City of Stock‑
ton, 390 F.3d 1105, 1109–15 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that certain parts of the 1974 statute 
authorizing the CDBG program created rights under, and therefore may be enforced through, 
42 U.S.C. § 1983); Davis v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 627 F.2d 942, 946 n.1 (9th Cir. 
1980) (avoiding the issue of whether § 1983 may be used to enforce claim against city receiv‑
ing CDBG funds); see also Alschuler v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 686 F.2d 472, 477–80 
(7th Cir. 1982) (suggesting that a private right of action exists to enforce HUD’s post–Shannon 
site–concentration regulations).
This issue remains uncertain today. See Michelle Ghaznavi Collins, Note, Opening Doors 
to Fair Housing: Enforcing the Affirmatively Further Provision of the Fair Housing Act Through 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 2135, 2163–70 (2010) (summarizing conflicting lower court 
cases after Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002)); see also Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 
F.3d 1114, 1127 (9th Cir. 2001) (suggesting that there is no private right of action under the 
1974 Act that created the CDBG and UDAG programs). 
116 See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) (providing for actions “seeking relief other than money 
damages”). Extensive equitable relief may be awarded in such cases. See, e.g., Kemp, 721 F. 
Supp. at 365–74. For more on the relief available in an APA suit against federal defendants, 
see Schwemm, supra note 4, at 12B–30 to –31.
The APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity also does not cover attorney’s fee awards. See 
Boston, 817 F.2d at 153. However, fee awards in successful § 3608 cases may be available under 
the Equal Access to Justice Act if HUD’s position is not “substantially justified.” 28 U.S.C. § 
2412(b), (d)(1)(A) (2006); see also Boston, 817 F.2d at 153 (implying that fees would be available 
under 42 U.S.C. § 2412(b) in a § 3608 case). For other fair housing cases involving fee awards 
under the Equal Access to Justice Act, see Schwemm, supra note 4, at 12B–33 n.20. 
117 Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988). 
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main substantive provisions118 and strengthening both the FHA’s private 
and governmental enforcement mechanisms in response to Congress’s 
perception that continuing high levels of housing discrimination had 
resulted in part from the inadequate enforcement system of the 1968 law.119 
The FHAA also directed HUD promptly to issue rules interpreting the 
newly amended FHA,120 which HUD did in early 1989.121 The FHAA did 
not, however, make any changes to § 3608’s requirements that HUD and 
other federal agencies administer their housing programs “affirmatively to 
further” the FHA’s policies.122
In making these other changes to the FHA while leaving § 3608’s 
mandates and enforcement unchanged, Congress in the FHAA is presumed 
to have adopted settled judicial interpretations of this provision.123 This 
presumption applies even when the judicial interpretations involved are 
those of a limited number of appellate courts.124
Just days before the FHAA’s enactment, HUD adopted an extensive 
set of regulations governing its CDGB program that spelled out the 
118 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604–3606 (2006); Schwemm, supra note 4, at § 5:3. Another substan‑
tive change made by the FHAA was to expand § 3605’s prohibition of mortgage discrimina‑
tion and other residential real estate–related transactions. See 42 U.S.C. § 3605; Schwemm, 
supra note 4, at 18–2 to –5.
119 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610–3614 (2006); Schwemm, supra note 4, at 5–8, § 5:4, nn.22–24 
and accompanying text, §§ 24:1—:2. The FHAA’s new enforcement system provided, inter 
alia, that private complaints could be filed with HUD and ultimately result in charges that 
were prosecuted by government lawyers either before a HUD administrative law judge or in 
federal court. See Schwemm, supra note 4, at § 24. Private complainants could also bypass this 
system and file suit directly in court, as was also true under the 1968 FHA. See 42 U.S.C. § 
3613(a) (2006); Schwemm, supra note 4, at § 24:1, n.11 and accompanying text. 
120 42 U.S.C. § 3614a (note on Initial Rulemaking).
121 24 C.F.R. §§ 100, 103, 105, 110, 115, 180 (2011) (promulgated at 54 Fed. Reg. 3232–
3317 (Jan. 23, 1989)). Courts are required to give substantial deference to these HUD regula‑
tions in interpreting the FHA. See Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 287–88 (2003); Chevron v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984); Schwemm, supra note 4, at 7–13 
to –15. For more on the deference owed to HUD’s interpretations of the FHA, see infra note 
159.
122 See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d), (e)(5) (2006). Another provision that the FHAA left intact 
was the statute’s anti–harassment ban, 42 U.S.C. § 3617, whose substantive prohibitions were, 
like § 3608’s, re–enacted verbatim. However, the FHAA did make § 3617–based claims sub‑
ject to the FHA’s regular enforcement methods, see 42 U.S.C. § 3602(f), Schwemm, supra note 
4, at 20–2 to –3, whereas § 3608’s enforcement was not changed. 
123 See Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605, 1616 
(2010) (“We have often observed that when ‘judicial interpretations have settled the meaning 
of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates, 
as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its . . . judicial interpretations as well.’” (quoting 
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998)); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978) (hold‑
ing that “Congress is presumed to . . . adopt [prior judicial] interpretation when it re–enacts a 
statute without change”).
124 See Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1616 (employing this doctrine based on three federal appel‑
late decisions).
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AFFH duties of grantees under this program.125 These regulations 
provided that CDBG grants would be made only if a grantee certified to 
HUD’s satisfaction that its grant would be conducted and administered 
in conformity with the FHA and that “the grantee [would] affirmatively 
further fair housing.”126 According to these regulations, a grantee would 
be considered to be in compliance with this certification requirement if it 
(1) conducted an analysis of fair housing impediments and (2) took action 
designed to address conditions identified as limiting fair housing choice, 
both elements of which were described in some detail in the governing 
regulation.127 CDBG grantees were also required to maintain records 
documenting the actions they had carried out “to remedy or ameliorate any 
impediments to fair housing choice in the recipient’s community,” such as 
the development of a fair housing analysis of impediments.128 
C. The 1988–2009 Period: CDBG’s Growth and Civil Rights Mandates 
1. The Growing Importance of CDBG.—By 1988, federal funds for the 
construction of new public housing had generally dried up. The principal 
program designed to foster new construction of affordable housing was 
the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program,129 but LIHTC 
125 See Amendments to Community Development Block Grant Regulations, 53 Fed. 
Reg. 34,416 (Sept. 6, 1988). These regulations had been pending as a proposed rule for almost 
four years, since October 31, 1984. See id. For more on the CDBG program, see supra note 101 
and infra Part II.C.1. 
126 24 C.F.R. § 570.601 (2010) (adopted at 53 Fed. Reg. 34,456 (Sept. 6, 1988)). Accord‑
ing to later judicial commentary, this certification system was designed to ensure that HUD 
grants are spent consistent with each grant program’s civil rights requirements and in recogni‑
tion that HUD lacked the resources to closely monitor the thousands of its CDBG grantees. 
See United States ex rel. Anti–Discrimination Ctr. v. Westchester Cnty., 495 F. Supp. 2d 375, 
384–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) [hereinafter Westchester I] (citing Comer v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 775, 792 
(2d Cir. 1994)).
127 24 C.F.R. § 570.904(c) (2010) (adopted at 53 Fed. Reg. 34,468 (Sept. 6, 1988)). With 
respect to the first element of conducting “an analysis to determine the impediments to fair 
housing,” the regulations provided that this analysis should include six specified areas, in‑
cluding “[p]ublic policies and actions affecting the approval of sites and other building re‑
quirements used in the approval process for the construction of publicly assisted housing.” § 
570.904(c)(1). With respect to the second element of “taking action” to address these impedi‑
ments, the regulations provided that these actions may include six specified items, includ‑
ing “[a]ctivities which assist in remedying findings or determinations of unlawful segregation 
or other discrimination involving assisted housing within the recipient’s jurisdiction.” Id. § 
570.904(c)(2)(v).
128 24 C.F.R. § 570.506(g) (2010) (adopted at 53 Fed. Reg. 34,454 (Sept. 6, 1988)). 
The “analysis of impediments” referred to in this regulation was the one “described in § 
570.904(c).” Id.; see supra note 127.
129 26 U.S.C. § 42 (2006); see also J. William Callison, Achieving Our Country: Geographic 
Desegregation and the Low–Income Housing Tax Credit, 19 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Soc. Just. 213, 225 
(2010) (“For many years, the LIHTC has been the largest federal program to finance the de‑
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is administered by the Treasury Department, which had not – and still has 
not – issued regulations indicating how § 3608’s mandates apply to this 
program.130 Furthermore, the UDAG program, which was a key element 
of the Boston case, has since expired.131 Thus, the key remaining sources 
of federal housing funds subject to § 3608 were Section 8132 and the 
Community Development Block Grant [hereinafter CDBG] program.133
 Today, CDBG is HUD’s largest grant program subject to § 3608’s 
mandates, accounting for some $3.6 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2009134 and 
velopment and rehabilitation of affordable rental housing for low–income households.”). See 
generally id. at 233–61 (describing the LIHTC program); Myron Orfield, Racial Integration and 
Community Revitalization: Applying the Fair Housing Act to the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, 58 
Vand. L. Rev. 1747, 1777–83 (2005). 
130 See Callison, supra note 129, at 251–55; Florence Wagman Roisman, Mandates Un-
satisfied: The Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program and the Civil Rights Laws, 52 Miami L. 
Rev. 1011, 1029– 49 (1998); see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.42–9(a) (2006) (providing that, in Treasury 
regulation, LIHTC units must be for “use by the general public” and that this requirement is 
satisfied if units are rented consistent with “housing policy governing non–discrimination, as 
evidenced by [specified] rules or regulations of [HUD]”).
For an example of a FHA case arising out of LIHTC developments, see Inclusive Com‑
munities Project, Inc. v. Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs, 749 F. Supp. 
2d 486, 491–92 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (awarding partial summary judgment against Texas agency 
accused of perpetuating segregation by limiting its approval of LIHTC projects in Dallas to 
minority neighborhoods).
131 See supra note 101. 
132 See Comer v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 775, 781–82 (2d Cir. 1994) (describing the Section 8 
rental program, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2006 & Supp. 2010), and the AFFH and other 
fair housing mandates that apply to it).
Section 8 programs are tenant–based or project–based. Under the tenant–based Section 8 
program, also known as the Housing Choice Voucher program, a low–income tenant receives 
a voucher for the Section 8 subsidy that can be given to a landlord who agrees to participate 
in the program and complies with its requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(f)(7), (o). Under the 
project–based Section 8 program, the owner of a multifamily rental property can enter into a 
Housing Assistant Payment contract with the local housing authority or HUD for a contract–
specific time period. Id. § 1437f(o)(13). Such a contract is termed “project–based” because 
the subsidy remains with the building when the tenant moves. Id. § 1437f(f)(6), (o)(13). “The 
Housing Choice Voucher Program (HVC) is currently the largest rental–assistance program 
administered by HUD.” Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, How Government Housing Perpetuates Racial 
Segregation: Lessons from Post–Katrina New Orleans, 60 Cath. U. L. Rev. 661, 674 (2011). For 
more background on the Section 8 program, see Tamica H. Daniel, Bringing Real Choice to the 
Housing Choice Voucher Program: Addressing Voucher Discrimination Under the Federal Fair Housing 
Act, 98 Geo. L. Rev. 769, 769–94 (2010); Schwemm, supra note 4, at 29–13 to –14.
133 In 1992, Congress created an important new program for revitalizing public hous‑
ing that came to be known as “HOPE VI,” which is subject to § 3608’s AFFH mandates. See 
Darst–Webbe Tenant Ass’n Bd. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 339 F.3d 702, 707 (8th Cir. 2003); see 
also Herbert R. Giorgio Jr., HUD’s Obligation to “Affirmatively Further” Fair Housing: A Closer 
Look at HOPE VI, 25 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 183 (2006) (describing the HOPE VI program 
and the Darst–Webb litigation).
134 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO–10–905, Housing and Community 
Grants: HUD Needs to Enhance Its Requirements and Oversight of Jurisdictions’ Fair 
Housing Plans 4–5 (2010) [hereinafter GAO Report], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.
Kentucky Law Journal148 [ Vol. 100
providing “annual grants on a formula basis to 1209 general units of local 
government and States.”135 Other HUD programs subject to § 3608 include 
the HOME Investment Partnership [hereinafter HOME] program, which 
provided about $1.8 billion in grants in FY 2009, and a number of smaller 
programs.136
As noted above,137 the CDBG program was created by Congress 
in 1974 to provide grants to local jurisdictions to develop “viable 
urban communities, by providing decent housing and a suitable living 
environment and expanding economic opportunities, principally for 
persons of low and moderate income.”138 CDBG grants are made to units 
of local governments and states (and their consortia); the former are cities 
in metropolitan areas with populations of over 50,000 and urban counties 
with more than 200,000 people (known as “entitlement communities”), 
while smaller “non–entitlement” localities may receive funds indirectly 
through grants made to their states or as part of a consortium led by an 
entitlement community.139 In Kentucky, for example, CDBG grants in 
FY 2010 were made to nine entitlement jurisdictions (the largest being 
Louisville–Jefferson County, which received $12,915,486) and to the state 
of Kentucky (which received $29,720,742).140 The cities and urban counties 
items/d10905.pdf. 
135 Community Development Block Grant Program–CDBG, Hud.Gov, http://www.hud.gov/
offices/cpd/communitydevelopment/programs (last visited Aug. 4, 2011) [hereinafter HUD–
CDBG Website]. 
136 GAO Report, supra note 134, at 5. The HOME program, which was created by Con‑
gress in 1990, is now “the largest government–sponsored affordable housing production pro‑
gram . . . and provides grants to states and localities, often in partnership with local nonprofit 
groups. These grants are used to fund a wide range of activities that build, buy and reha‑
bilitate affordable housing for rent or sale and provide direct rental assistance to low–income 
people.” Id. Other HUD programs subject to § 3608 include the Emergency Shelter Grants 
(ESG) program, which provides grants to help homeless persons and was funded at about $1.7 
billion in FY 2009, and the Housing Opportunities for Persons with AIDS (HOPWA) program, 
which provides grants to help low–income persons with HIV/AIDS and was funded at about 
$310 million in FY 2009. Id.; see also supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing the 
HOPE VI program).
137 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
138 42 U.S.C. § 5301(c) (2006). “CDBG funds may be used for a wide variety of housing, 
community and economic development activities” in any of “90 different categories” chosen 
by the individual grantee–jurisdiction to meet its “local needs.” CDBG Expenditure Reports, 
Hud.Gov, http://portal.hud.gov:80/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/comm_planning/
communitydevelopment/budget/disbursementreports (last visited Sept. 24, 2011). 
139 HUD, “Basically CDBG” Course Training Manual 1–4, 1–5 (2007) [here‑
inafter Basically CDBG], available at http://portal.hud.gov:80/hudportal/documents/
huddoc?id=DOC_16470.pdf.
140 HUD, Community Planning and Development Program Formula Allocations 
for FY 2010, Hud.Gov, http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/about/budget/budget10/ (last vis‑
ited July 5, 2011). Besides Louisville–Jefferson County, the other eight Kentucky entitle‑
ment jurisdictions (and the amount of their grants) were Ashland ($746,634), Bowling Green 
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that participate as entitlement communities account for the largest part of 
the CDBG program, receiving seventy percent of its appropriations; these 
communities automatically receive an annual allocation of funds, whose 
amount is determined by a set formula.141
The 1974 statute that created CDBG and certain other HUD grant 
programs made them subject to that law’s nondiscrimination mandate, 
which was patterned after Title VI’s.142 In addition, this statute requires 
CDBG recipients to certify to HUD’s satisfaction that their grant “will be 
conducted and administered in conformity with the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 . . . and the Fair Housing Act . . . . and the grantee will affirmatively 
further fair housing.”143
 HUD regulations implementing the 1974 law have consistently 
repeated the statutory requirement that CDBG grantees certify that they 
will comply with the FHA and will “affirmatively further fair housing.”144 
As noted above, HUD’s 1988 amendments to these regulations provided 
for annual performance reviews that required, inter alia, each grantee to 
show it had “carried out its CDBG–funded program in accordance with civil 
rights certifications” and with the FHA and various other civil rights laws, 
which included “the grantee’s . . . [certification] that it will affirmatively 
further fair housing.”145
2. The 1990s: Further § 3608–Based Regulations and Guidance.—In 1990, 
Congress amended the CDBG statute to require jurisdictions applying for 
grants to certify they were following a “housing affordability strategy” that 
included a five–year estimate of the jurisdiction’s housing needs for low– 
and moderate–income people, which came to be known as a “Consolidated 
Plan.”146 The 1990 amendments again required that all CDBG grantees 
provide a “certification that the jurisdiction will affirmatively further fair 
housing.”147
($610,765), Covington ($1,786,407), Elizabethtown ($172,458), Henderson ($275,017), Hop‑
kinsville ($313,015), Lexington–Fayette County ($2,278,561), and Owensboro ($588,736). Id. 
141 Basically CDBG, supra note 139, at 1–4. 
142 See 42 U.S.C. § 5309(a) (2006) (banning discrimination based on race, color, national 
origin, religion, or sex in “any program or activity . . . [receiving] funds made available under 
this chapter”). For more on Title VI’s nondiscrimination mandate, see supra notes 27–29 and 
accompanying text.
143 42 U.S.C. § 5304(b)(2) (2006).
144 24 C.F.R. § 91.225(a)(1) (2011); see also 24 C.F.R. §§ 91.325(b)(5), 91.425(a)(1)(i) 
(2011); 24 C.F.R § 570.303 (1988). The HUD regulations governing the CDBG and other 
grant programs created by the 1974 law are set forth in 24 C.F.R. § 91 and 24 C.F.R § 570.
145 24 C.F.R. § 570.904(a), (c); see also supra note 127 and accompanying text (describing 
24 C.F.R. § 570.904(c).
146 42 U.S.C. § 12,705(b)(1) (2006) (part of the National Affordable Housing Act of 1990). 
For more on the Consolidated Plan, see infra note 156. 
147 42 U.S.C. § 12,705(b)(15). Thus, by 1994, it was clear, according to the Second Cir‑
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In 1995, HUD adopted new regulations governing the CDBG and all 
other HUD community planning and development grant programs.148 The 
1995 regulations, which have remained in effect with minor amendments 
to this day, govern grantees’ Consolidated Plans and require a single 
performance report for all HUD grant programs.149 With respect to the 
grantees’ AFFH obligations, the 1995 regulations require each grantee to 
submit to HUD a yearly certification that it “will affirmatively further fair 
housing.”150 This means, according to the regulations, that the grantee will 
do three specific things: “[1] conduct an analysis to identify impediments 
to fair housing choice within the jurisdiction, . . . [2] take appropriate 
actions to overcome the effects of any impediments identified through that 
analysis, and [3] maintain records reflecting the analysis and actions in this 
regard.”151 The earlier version of this regulation had also included these 
three elements,152 but the 1995 regulations made them “requirements” 
rather than merely “performance standards” for AFFH.153
As part of its new 1995 regulatory requirements concerning grantees’ 
AFFH responsibilities, HUD announced that each jurisdiction–recipient 
“is expected to have conducted its first analysis of impediments” [AI] 
within one year of the effective date of the 1995 regulations (i.e., February 
cuit, that:
As conditions to receive CDBG funds, the grantee must (1) “affirmatively further 
fair housing,” . . . ; (2) administer the grant in conformance with [Title VI] . . . (non–
discrimination in federally assisted programs); and the FHA . . . ; and (3) submit an 
annual performance report for HUD’s review . . . [that] must address the CDBG 
recipient’s compliance with Title VI and [the FHA], and the recipient’s efforts at 
meeting the statutory obligations to promote fair housing.
Comer v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 775, 783 (2d Cir. 1994).
148 Consolidated Submission for Community Planning and Development Programs, 60 
Fed. Reg. 1878–1918 (Jan. 5, 1995). Besides CDBG, the new regulations governed the HOME 
Investment Partnership (HOME), Emergency Shelter Grant (ESG), and Housing Opportuni‑
ties for Persons with AIDS (HOPWA) programs. Id. at 1878.
149 Id. at 1878. 
150 24 C.F.R. § 91.225(a)(1) (2011); see 24 C.F.R. §§ 570.487(b) (2011), 570.601(a)(2) 
(2011).
151 24 C.F.R. § 91.225(a)(1) (2011); see 24 C.F.R. §§ 91.325(a)(1), 91.425(a)(1)(i) (2011) 
(setting forth similar requirements for states and consortia that receive CDBG funds). 
The 1995 regulations also established performance review criteria for CDBG grantees 
that specifically set forth similar fair housing requirements. This regulation simply states: 
“See the requirements in the Fair Housing Act . . . , as well as section 570.601(a), which sets 
forth the grantee’s responsibility to certify that it will affirmatively further fair housing.” 24 
C.F.R. § 570.904(c) (2011). The 1988 version was more detailed. See supra note 127 (quoting 
24 C.F.R. § 570.904(c) (1988)).
152 See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.
153 Consolidated Submission for Community Planning and Development Programs, 60 
Fed. Reg. at 1895.
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6, 1996).154 A new AI need not be done every year thereafter,155 but grantees 
would have to provide a summary of their AIs in other required reports 
to HUD. These reports included a “Consolidated Plan” every five years 
that specifies how grantees intended to use their federal funds to address 
the housing needs of low– and moderate–income people (within which 
grantees must provide their AFFH certifications annually);156 an “Annual 
Action Plan” laying out how the grantees planned to achieve these overall 
objectives;157 and a yearly performance report on the progress made in 
carrying out their Annual Action Plans.158
HUD announced in its commentary to the 1995 regulations that it 
would shortly issue additional guidance to assist grantees in fulfilling these 
new requirements,159 and the next year, it complied by publishing a “Fair 
Housing Planning Guide.”160 According to this Guide, the three elements 
154 Id.
155 Id. Although “AIs are not to be submitted to, or be approved by, HUD[,] . . . HUD 
could request submission of the AI in the event of a complaint or as part of routine monitor‑
ing.” HUD, Fair Housing Planning Guide 2–7 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 HUD Guide], avail-
able at http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/images/fhpg.pdf. 
156 The Consolidated Plan serves four main functions: “[a] planning document for the 
jurisdiction,” “[a] submission for federal funds under HUD’s formula grant programs,” “[a] 
strategy to be followed in carrying out HUD programs,” and “[a] management tool for assess‑
ing performance and tracking results.” 24 C.F.R. § 91.1(b) (2006). 
157 As part of the Consolidated Plan process, each grantee is required to make annual 
Action Plan submissions to HUD, which address the goals and objectives for the grantee as 
they related to the categories discussed above. Id. §§ 91.220, 91.420. The Action Plan includes 
the grantee’s annual applications for funding, as well as the grantee’s annual express certifica‑
tion that it would AFFH. Id. §§ 91.225, 91.425. The grantee also makes annual submissions, 
called Consolidated Annual Performance and Evaluation Reports (“CAPERs”), reviewing the 
“progress it has made in carrying out its strategic plan and its action plan” over the previous 
year. Id. § 91.520(a).
158 GAO Report, supra note 134, at 7–8. In the 1996 Hud Guide, see supra note 155, 
HUD explained the relationship of a grantee’s AI and its Consolidated Plan. This guide noted 
that grantees should prepare AIs using a “Fair Housing Perspective,” which means that:
[W]hile the explanation of barriers to affordable housing to be included in the 
Consolidated Plan may contain a good deal of relevant AI information[, it] may 
not go far or deep enough into factors that have made poor housing conditions 
more severe for certain groups in the lower–income population than for others. 
Jurisdictions should be aware of the extent to which discrimination or other causes 
that may have a discriminatory effect play a role in producing the more severe 
conditions for certain groups.
1996 HUD Guide, supra note 155, at 2–20, 2–21.
159 Consolidated Submission for Community Planning and Development Programs, 60 
Fed. Reg. 1878, 1878–79 (Jan. 5, 1995).
160 1996 HUD Guide, supra note 155. To the extent this guide includes interpreta‑
tions of the FHA or FHA–based regulations, these interpretations are “entitled to respect” to 
the extent that they have the “power to persuade.” United States ex rel. Anti–Discrimination 
Ctr. v. Westchester Cnty., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) [hereinafter Westchester II] 
(quoting Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)) (holding that the HUD Guide, 
being “firmly rooted in the statutory and regulatory framework and consistent with the case 
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making up the “affirmatively furthering” goal (i.e, conducting an AI, taking 
appropriate actions, and maintaining relevant records) require a grantee, inter 
alia, to “[a]nalyze and eliminate housing discrimination in the jurisdiction” 
and to “[p]rovide opportunities for inclusive patterns of housing occupancy 
regardless of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, disability and national 
origin.”161 A proper AI involves “[a]n assessment of conditions, both public 
and private, affecting fair housing choice for all protected classes.”162 Such 
impediments are “actions, omissions or decisions” which “restrict housing 
choices or the availability of housing choices,” or which have the effect 
of doing so, based on “race, color, religion, sex, disability, familial status, 
or national origin,”163 including “[p]olicies, practices, or procedures that 
appear neutral on their face.”164 HUD’s suggested AI format included a 
housing profile describing “the degree of segregation and restricted housing 
by race, ethnicity, disability status, and families with children[, and] how 
segregation and restricted housing supply occurred.”165 Finally, the Guide 
stated that “[g]rantees are strongly encouraged to annually update their 
analysis of impediments,”166 and elsewhere HUD recommended that 
“grantees update their AIs every 3 to 5 years.”167 
To summarize, CDBG grantees as of 1995 were required to provide 
HUD with AFFH certifications every year and, as part of this process, 
to provide a new AI in 1996, with the presumption that their AIs would 
regularly be updated and that they would be taking appropriate actions 
to overcome impediments identified in these AIs and maintaining records 
to demonstrate their AI process and related actions. Failure to meet these 
requirements was grounds for even “entitlement” recipients to lose their 
HUD grants.168
law, is persuasive on the issue of whether” the defendant conducted a proper AI). See gener-
ally Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 397 (2008) (holding that “the agency is 
entitled to further deference when it adopts a reasonable interpretation of regulations it has 
put in force”).
161 1996 HUD Guide, supra note 155, at 1–3.
162 Id. at 2–7. Such an AI should also include a “comprehensive review of a jurisdic‑
tion’s laws, regulations, and administrative policies, procedures, and practices” and “[a]n as‑
sessment of how those laws, etc. affect the location, availability, and accessibility of housing.” 
Id.
163 Id. at 2–8.
164 Id. at 2–17.
165 Id. at 2–28.
166 Basically CDBG, supra note 139, at 19–2. 
167 GAO Report, supra note 134, at 6.
168 See United States v. Inc. Island Park, 888 F. Supp. 419, 450–53 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(awarding summary judgment to the United States in action against CDBG recipient for its 
fraudulently failing to AFFH and ordering return of defendant’s CDBG funds for a multi–
year period).
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3. 2000–2008: The Grantees’ Responses and HUD Inaction.—The record of 
CDBG grantees in complying with their post–1995 AFFH requirements has 
been mixed at best. In reviewing grantees’ AIs covering the period 2005–
2009, the General Accounting Office determined that 6% of these AIs were 
from dates “unknown” and an additional “29 percent . . . were prepared in 
2004 or earlier, including 11 percent that date from the 1990s.”169 Even as 
to the remaining 64% whose AIs were fairly recent, the GAO questioned 
“the usefulness of many such AIs as fair housing planning documents . . 
. [because] a significant majority of the current AIs did not identify time 
frames for implementing the recommendations or contain the signatures of 
top elected officials as . . . suggested in HUD’s guidance.”170
HUD’s response was indifferent. Few grants were denied or rescinded, 
nor, apparently, were any of the grantees with out–dated or inadequate AIs 
criticized or threatened with remedial action.171 HUD–sponsored materials 
as of 2002 dealing with the AFFH and AI requirements did bemoan the 
fact that “[d]uring the past thirty–seven years, Congress has spent more 
than one trillion dollars in a failed attempt to remedy the effects of a dual 
housing market in America.”172 These HUD materials “traced the evolution 
of the dual market to, inter alia, African–Americans migrating to cities and 
encountering obstacles ‘designed to segregate them from the majority, and 
169 GAO Report, supra note 134, at 9–10. In 2009, HUD completed an internal study 
that found “that many AIs were outdated or appeared to have been prepared in a cursory 
fashion and found that the department’s oversight was limited.” Id. at 2 (citing U.S. Dept. of 
Hous. & Urb. Dev., Analysis of Impediments Study (2009)). The goal of this study was “to 
assess the extent to which the AIs were produced in accordance to HUD’s 1996 Fair Housing 
Planning Guide. Id.
170 Id. at 9–10; see Nat’l Comm’n on Fair Hous. & Equal Opportunity, The Future of 
Fair Housing 45 (2008) [hereinafter National Fair Housing Report] (estimating that less 
than 10% of CDBG entitlement jurisdictions have programs “that really address fair housing 
concerns in their communities”), available at http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/LinkClick.
aspx?fileticket= w23zLzobpwA%3d&tabid=3917&mid=8614. 
Still, some CDBG grantees did do serious AIs for their areas. See, e.g., id. at 45 & nn.246–
47 (listing Atlanta, Boston, Los Angeles, Richmond, and Toledo as examples of communities 
with strong AFFH efforts). For more on those jurisdictions that have produced appropriate 
AIs, see infra note 274 and accompanying text.
171 Matthew J. Termine, Promoting Residential Integration through the Fair Housing Act: Are 
Qui Tam Actions a Viable Method of Enforcing “Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing” Violations?, 
79 Fordham L. Rev. 1367, 1392 (2010) (“[A] ‘long–time HUD employee said he could think 
of only three instances over 20 years in which HUD’ terminated CDBG funding for failure 
to comply with the AFFH duty”); Breymaier, supra note 62, at 249 (stating that HUD has 
never denied funding to a CDBG recipient because of its failure to AFFH). But cf. Inc. Island 
Park, 888 F. Supp. at 458 (ordering, in a case brought by the United States, a refund of CDBG 
money from a municipality that fundamentally failed to AFFH). 
172   Westchester II, 668 F. Supp. at 555–56 (quoting 2002 HUD–sponsored training mate‑
rials entitled “Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing [:] Conducting the Analysis of Impedi‑
ments and Beyond”).
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to maintain a dual society,’”173 but neither this observation nor the on–going 
failure of CDBG grantees to adequately meet their AFFH responsibilities 
led to any significant action by HUD in terms of withholding funds.
III. A New Approach: The Westchester Litigation
A. The Plaintiff’s Claim and the District Court’s Decisions
This inertia was disrupted by a novel suit brought in 2006 by a private fair 
housing organization, the Anti–Discrimination Center of Metro New York 
(“ADC”), against Westchester County, New York.174 Westchester County 
covers a wealthy suburban area immediately north of New York City; the 
county has a population of approximately 950,000 people and some 45 local 
governmental units ranging in size from small villages with a few thousands 
residents to the city of Yonkers with some 200,000 residents.175
The metropolitan area, of which Westchester is a part, is one of the 
most segregated in the country.176 Within Westchester, racial concentration 
is extreme: the County’s northern areas are virtually all white, while in the 
south, a few communities have substantial black populations (as high as 
59%) but many others are less than 1% black.177
173 Id. at 556. 
174 Westchester I, 495 F. Supp. 2d 375 (denying motion to dismiss); United States ex rel. 
Anti–Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548 (deciding cross motions for sum‑
mary judgment). 
For a description of this litigation by the architects of the plaintiff’s position, see Craig 
Gurian & Michael Allen, Making Real the Desegregating Promise of the Fair Housing Act: “Affirma-
tively Furthering Fair Housing” Comes of Age, 43 Clearinghouse Rev. 560 (2010); Michael Allen, 
No Certification, No Money: The Revival of Civil Rights Obligations Under HUD Funding Programs, 
78 Plan. Comm’rs J. 16 (2010).
175  See Furman Center for Real Estate & Urban Policy, New York University, An 
Overview of Affirmative Marketing and Implications for the Westchester Fair Housing 
Settlement 3 n.1 (2011), available at http://furmancenter.org/files/publications/Furman_
Center_Review_of_Affirmative_Marketing.pdf. 
176   See John Iceland & Daniel H. Weinberg, U.S. Census Bureau, Racial and Eth‑
nic Residential Segregation in the United States: 1980–2000 69 (2002), available at http://
www.census.gov/hhes/www /housing/housing_patterns/pdf/censr–3.pdf; see also supra text ac‑
companying notes 44–45 (listing the New York City metropolitan area as one of the most 
segregated in the country).
177 See Westchester County Department of Planning Databook 44 (2011), available 
at http://planning.westchestergov.com/images/stories/DataBook/population.pdf (providing 
data for all Westchester municipalities’ populations by race); Westchester County, N.Y.: Per‑
cent Black Person by Census Tract, 2000 (2011), available at http://giswww.westchestergov.
com/wcgis/Census/2010_Tracts_Minority.pdf (providing map depicting the concentrations of 
Westchester’s black population).
Furthermore, the municipalities in Westchester have a long history of actively opposing 
integration efforts, particularly by restricting affordable housing to the County’s few minority 
areas (e.g., southwest Yonkers) and only allowing such housing in white areas if it is restricted 
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The ADC’s suit alleged that each year from 2000 through 2006, 
Westchester County applied to HUD for CDBG and other federal funds 
on behalf of itself and a consortium of most of the municipalities in the 
county.178 According to the ADC, Westchester County obtained over $50 
million dollars in federal grants in the 2000–2006 period,179 during which it 
did not meet its AFFH responsibilities by, inter alia, not properly analyzing 
impediments to fair housing choice in its area or taking appropriate action 
to overcome these impediments as required by HUD’s regulations.180
What made this suit novel was that it was brought not under these 
regulations or § 3608, but rather under the False Claims Act (“FCA”).181 
The FCA is a federal statute dating back to the Civil War that authorizes 
private parties to bring qui tam suits in the name of the United States 
against those who have submitted false or fraudulent claims for payment 
to local residents or the elderly. See United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1186 
(2d Cir. 1987) (affirming determination that local officials were responsible for intentionally 
segregating Yonkers’ housing and schools by race). For a detailed description of the Yonkers 
litigation, see Peter H. Schuck, Judging Remedies: Judicial Approaches to Housing Segregation, 37 
Harv. C.R.–C.L. L. Rev. 289, 324–64 (2002). Professor Schuck notes that, even after Yonkers’ 
segregative land–use policies were held to violate the FHA, it continued to receive CDBG 
funds. Id. at 347. 
For more on segregation in Westchester, see infra note 199 and accompanying text.
178 Westchester I, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 377. The complaint focused on the period of April 1, 
2000, to April 1, 2006, id., although Westchester had in fact received CDBG funds for more 
than 30 years. See Westchester County Urban Consortium, Community Development 
Block Grant: Program Manual for FY 2012–2014, at 2 (noting that “[t]he Westchester 
Urban County Consortium has received CDBG funding since the program was established 
in 1976”), available at http://planning.westchestergov.com/images/stories/pdfs/cdbg/
programmanual_complete.pdf. 
The Westchester consortium was made up of some 40 local municipalities, i.e., all of 
the governmental units in the county except for Mount Pleasant, Mount Vernon, New 
Rochelle, White Plains, and Yonkers, the latter four of which were themselves “entitlement 
communities” and therefore received their own grants directly. See CDBG Performance 
Profiles New York, HUD.GOV, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program _offices 
/comm_planning/community development/library/performanceprofiles/ny. 
179 Westchester II, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 550. The CDBG grants awarded to Westchester 
and its consortium were the main focus of this litigation, Westchester I, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 386 
n.7, although the consortium also received some federal funds under the Emergency Shelter 
Grant, HOME Investment Partnership, and Housing Opportunities for Persons with AIDS 
programs. See Westchester II, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 552 n.4.
180 Westchester II, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 550. For a review of the certifications that CDBG 
recipients are required to file with HUD, see supra notes 144–45, 150–53, 156–57 and accom‑
panying text.
181 Westchester II, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 550; False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006). 
This was not the first time the FCA had been used as the basis for a § 3608–related suit, see su-
pra note 168 (describing United States v. Inc. Island Park, 888 F. Supp. 419, 437–44 (E.D.N.Y. 
1995)), but it was the first time a private complainant rather than the United States initiated 
such a suit.
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to the federal government.182 The ADC alleged that Westchester County 
violated the FCA by falsely certifying to HUD that it had properly engaged 
in the required AFFH process during the years that the County received 
CDBG funds.183
Pursuant to the FCA’s procedures, this suit was kept under seal while 
the United States decided whether to intervene and take over the case as 
lead plaintiff.184 After some delays, the Government finally determined in 
late 2006 that it would not intervene, leaving the ADC to proceed on its 
own, and its complaint was served on Westchester in early 2007.185
In order for the ADC to sue under the FCA, its claim had to be based 
on “non–public” information,186 which the ADC alleged came from 
Westchester County’s responses to an ADC request made under New York 
state’s Freedom of Information Law (“FOIL”).187 Westchester responded 
with a motion to dismiss, claiming both that the suit was improper because 
it was based on the types of public reports barred by the FCA and also 
that the County’s AFFH certifications were not fraudulent. The district 
court denied this motion in mid–2007.188 It first held that, although the 
information obtained by the ADC through its FOIL request was indeed 
public, that information “was not obtained from a source enumerated in 
the [FCA’s] Section 3730(e)(4)(A) jurisdictional bar.”189
The court then proceeded to uphold the merits of the ADC’s claim. 
The gist of the parties’ dispute here was whether Westchester was required 
182 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a), 3730(b)(1). For more on the False Claims Act and its remedial 
provisions, see infra notes 184–89, 205–07 and accompanying text.
183 See Westchester I, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 376–77.
184 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2); see also 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c); Westchester I, 495 F. Supp. 2d 
at 378.
185 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3); Westchester I, 495 F. Supp. 2d 375, 378. 
186 At the time, the FCA foreclosed qui tam suits that were “based upon the public 
disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a 
congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or 
investigation, or from the news media.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). This provision has since 
been amended and now forecloses qui tam suits if the allegations are “based upon the public 
disclosure of allegations or transactions . . . in a congressional, administrative, or Government 
Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation.” Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United 
States ex rel. Kirk, 131 S.Ct. 1885, 1889 n.1 (2011) (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)).
187 Westchester I, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 380. Westchester’s FOIL “responses consisted in part 
of state and local administrative reports produced following an administrative investigation.” 
Id.
188 Id. at 377.
189 Id. at 383. Four years later, the Supreme Court in a different case interpreted the 
FCA’s § 3730(e)(4)(A) to forbid private suits based on reports generated under the federal 
Freedom of Information Act. Schindler, 131 S.Ct. at 1889–96; see also supra note 186 (describing 
recent amendment to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)). By the time Schindler was decided, however, 
the ADC’s claim against Westchester County had been settled. See infra note 209 and accom‑
panying text.
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“to identify racial discrimination and segregation as impediments to ‘fair 
housing’ when it certifies as a condition for receipt of federal funds that it 
will affirmatively further fair housing.”190 Westchester argued that its AIs 
properly focused on housing affordability and income issues rather than 
race and that “income is arguably a better proxy for determining need 
than race when distributing housing funds.”191 The ADC countered that 
this approach ignored § 3608’s mandates and resulted in increased racial 
segregation in the county through the location of subsidized housing in 
areas where minorities were already concentrated.192
The district court sided with the ADC, concluding that “an interpretation 
of ‘affirmatively further fair housing’ that excludes consideration of race 
would be an absurd result.”193 The court held that a grantee that certifies 
to HUD that it will AFFH as a condition of receiving federal funds must 
analyze “the existence and impact of race discrimination on housing 
opportunities and choice in its jurisdiction.”194 Thus, the court concluded:
The complaint alleges that Westchester violated the FCA when 
it submitted a false certification to obtain federal funds. It alleges 
that Westchester did not consider the existence and impact of race 
discrimination on housing opportunities and choice but nonetheless 
certified that it would administer its grant in conformity with the two 
governing statutes and would affirmatively further fair housing. This is 
sufficient to state a claim.195
The parties then engaged in a year of discovery, after which both 
moved for summary judgment. On February 24, 2009, the district court 
denied Westchester’s motion and granted in part ADC’s motion.196 The 
court found the undisputed facts established that during the 2000–2006 
190 Westchester I, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 383–84.
191 Id. at 389.
192 See id. at 387–89.
193 Id. at 388.
194 Id. at 376. 
At a minimum, when a grantee certifies that the grant will be “conducted and 
administered” in conformity with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fair Hous‑
ing Act, and certifies that it “will affirmatively further fair housing,” the grantee 
must consider the existence and impact of race discrimination on housing oppor‑
tunities and choice in its jurisdiction. In identifying impediments to fair housing 
choice, it must consider impediments erected by race discrimination, and if such 
impediments exist, it must take appropriate action to overcome the effects of those 
impediments. 
Id. at 387.
195 Id. at 387; see also id. at 384 (holding that the complaint “does state a claim for a 
violation of the FCA”). The court also held that the ADC stated its complaint of fraud with 
sufficient particularity to satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Id. at 389–90.
196 United States ex rel. Anti–Discrimination Ctr. v. Westchester Cty., 668 F. Supp. 2d 
548, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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period: (1) Westchester received over $52 million in CDBG funds;197 (2) 
Westchester made annual certifications to HUD that it would AFFH;198 (3) 
Westchester was aware that the County’s housing was highly segregated 
by race when it prepared and submitted its AIs;199 (4) Westchester’s AIs, 
by focusing only on affordable housing and not racial discrimination and 
segregation, failed to analyze how the County’s placement of affordable 
housing affected race–based segregation and, in fact, the County’s 
production and placement of affordable housing actually increased such 
segregation;200 (5) the County never funded or assisted the production of 
affordable housing in any municipality that opposed such production and, 
in fact, at least sixteen Westchester municipalities had not created a single 
unit of affordable housing as of mid–2005;201 and (6) Westchester never 
deemed any of its municipalities to be failing to AFFH nor to be impeding 
the County’s ability to AFFH and, as such, did not withhold any funds 
or impose any sanctions on any participating municipalities for failure to 
AFFH.202 
Based on these findings, the court held that Westchester’s “certifications 
to HUD were false when they represented that the County would take 
appropriate actions to overcome the effects of race–based impediments 
to fair housing choice that its analysis had identified.”203 As to the further 
197 Id. at 559. The County submitted “payment vouchers to HUD to draw down the 
funds from a line of credit. Approximately 25 payment vouchers per month were approved 
for payment.” Id. at 560. For more on the significance of these payment vouchers, see infra 
note 203. 
198 Westchester II, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 552–53.
[T]he County submitted two Consolidated Plans (one covering the years 2000–
2004 and one covering the years 2004–2008). It also submitted annual Action Plans 
(with express AFFH certifications). . . . The County included its 2000 and 2004 AIs 
in the Consolidated Plans it submitted to HUD, although the regulations did not 
require that the AIs themselves be submitted to HUD.
Id. at 553.
199 Id. at 559. “According to the 2000 census, over half of the municipalities in the Con‑
sortium had African–American populations of 3% or less.” Id. The existence of racial concen‑
tration in parts of the County was well known to local officials, as was the fact that such con‑
centration “may decrease if affordable housing opportunities were available in predominantly 
white areas and African–Americans chose to live or move to those areas.” Id.; see also supra 
notes 176–77 and accompanying text.
200 Westchester II, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 559, 562. 
201 See id. at 559. This was despite the fact that in 1993 the County had set a goal of cre‑
ating 5000 new affordable housing units. Id. Furthermore, “[w]hen the County consider[ed] 
where to acquire land for affordable housing, it [sought] the concurrence of the municipality 
where the land is situated, and . . . the County [did] not acquire any such land without the 
municipality’s agreement.” Id.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 565. “Because the County never did the required analysis of race–based im‑
pediments, it never created a contemporaneous record of how its management of the HUD–
acquired funds or any other ‘appropriate’ steps it could take would overcome the effects of 
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issue of whether the County knowingly submitted false certifications, the 
court held that the evidence was disputed and therefore denied summary 
judgment.204
At this stage, therefore, the ADC had established all but one of the 
elements necessary for a FCA case (i.e., the knowledge element).205 Based 
on the FCA’s relief provisions, the ADC stood to recover $40–$50 million 
if it ultimately prevailed on this remaining issue,206 although it could not 
obtain injunctive or other equitable relief.207
B. Government Intervention and Settlement
A few months before the summary judgment ruling, Barack Obama was 
elected president and, upon taking office in January of 2009, appointed 
new senior officials at HUD and the Department of Justice. In August 2009, 
the Justice Department moved to intervene in the Westchester litigation.208 
Immediately after this motion was granted, Justice on behalf of HUD 
settled with Westchester County in an order that required the County to 
pay damages and to develop and implement a housing policy that combats 
residential segregation.209 At the time, HUD described this order as a 
those impediments.” Id.
The court also held that the County’s submission of individual monthly payment vouch‑
ers, see supra note 197, amounted to false claims as well, because the “requests for payments 
asked the United States to pay certain grant money—grant money that [sic] been expressly 
conditioned on the certification that the County would AFFH. As such, the requests for pay‑
ment of those grants funds impliedly certified their compliance with the grant requirements, 
including the requirement to AFFH.” Id. at 567.
204 Id. at 567–70. The County argued that the FCA also required proof that the defen‑
dant’s falsehood damaged the United States, but the court rejected this argument. Id. at 568.
205 See id. at 568–71. According to the district court, the elements that the ADC needed 
to show to establish Westchester’s liability under the FCA were that Westchester “(1) made 
a claim, (2) to the United States government, (3) that is false or fraudulent, (4) knowing of its 
falsity, and (5) seeking payment from the federal treasury.” Id. at 560 (citing Mikes v. Straus, 
274 F.3d 687, 695 (2d Cir. 2001)). Because Westchester did not challenge the existence of 
Elements (1), (2), and (5), id., and because the court granted the ADC’s motion for summary 
judgment on Element (3), only Element (4) was in dispute after this decision. Id. at 570–71.
206 Id. at 559. The FCA provides for civil penalties and treble damages, see 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3729(a) (2006), and when, as here, the Government chooses not to intervene in a qui tam 
action, a private plaintiff “stands to receive between 25% and 30% of the proceeds of the ac‑
tion.” Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 131 S. Ct. 1885, 1890 (2011) (citing 
31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2)). If the Government does intervene, the private party bringing the ac‑
tion is entitled to a lesser percentage of the recovery. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1).
207 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2).
208 Memorandum of Law of the U.S. of Am. in Support of Its Application to Inter‑
vene, United States ex rel. Anti–Discrimination Ctr. v. Westchester Cnty., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 06–2860), 2009 WL 2899691.
209 See Stipulation & Order of Settlement & Dismissal, United States ex rel. Anti–Dis‑
crimination Ctr. v. Westchester Cnty., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 06–2860) 
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“landmark civil rights agreement” and “a historic civil rights settlement,”210 
and HUD Secretary Donovan announced that the agreement signaled “a 
new commitment by HUD” to ensuring equal housing opportunities.211
 The Westchester settlement order requires the County within seven years 
to spend $51.6 million to develop at least 750 affordable housing units, 
primarily in municipalities with overwhelmingly white populations.212 
The order called for the district court to retain jurisdiction to oversee the 
progress of these activities and for the court to appoint a Government–
selected Monitor to deal with the plan’s details.213 In addition, Westchester 
agreed to pay $7.5 million to the ADC, along with $2.5 million for the 
ADC’s attorney’s fees.214
C. Post–Settlement Phase
The post–settlement phase of this litigation has not gone smoothly.215 
The settlement order required the approval of Westchester’s Board of 
Legislators, which it gave on September 22, 2009,216 but not before a 
number of members expressed opposition.217 In the next county–wide 
[hereinafter Settlement Order]; see also Press Release, U.S. DOJ, Westchester Cnty. Agrees to 
Develop Hundreds of Units of Fair and Affordable Hous. in Settlement of Fed. Lawsuit (Aug. 
10, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/documents/westchester_pr.pdf 
(describing the settlement order).
210 See Press Release, HUD, HUD and Justice Announce Landmark Civil Rights 
Agreement in Westchester Cnty. (Aug. 10, 2009), available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/
HUD?src=/press/press_releases _media_advisories/2009/HUDNo.09–149.
211 Id.; see also Housing Fairness Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 476 Before the Subcomm. on 
Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 1 (2010) [hereinafter 
Trasviña Statement] (statement by HUD Assistant Sec’y for Fair Hous. and Equal Opportunity 
John D. Trasviña) (“HUD has not always fulfilled its obligation to ensure that our money 
is spent in ways that affirmatively further fair housing. In this new day, however, there is a 
Department–wide commitment to incorporate our mandate to affirmatively furthering fair 
housing into all of our work so that we can fulfill our shared goal of truly integrated and bal‑
anced living patterns.”).
212 See Settlement Order, supra note 209, paras. 2–3, 5–7, 39. The $51.6 million figure is a 
combination of $30 million that the County agreed to spend out of its own funds and $21.6 
million, which was the portion that HUD would reserve for the County out of the $30 million 
Westchester agreed to pay to the United States to resolve the FCA claims. See id. paras. 2–3.
213 Id. paras. 9–14.
214 Press Release, supra note 210. 
215 See, e.g., Daniel Denvir, Segregation in the Land of Limousine Liberalism, Salon July 
1, 2011, http://www.salon.com/news/politics/war_room/2011/07/01/denvir_westchester_
segregation.
216 See Monitor’s Report Regarding Implementation of the Stipulation & Order of Set‑
tlement & Dismissal for the Period of July 7, 2010 Through October 25, 2010 at 1, U.S. ex 
rel. Anti–Discrimination Ctr. v. Westchester Cnty., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 
06–2860) [hereinafter Monitor’s Report].
217 See Joseph Berger, In Westchester, an Open Plea to Accept a Housing Accord, N.Y. Times, 
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election, the County’s chief executive was defeated by a candidate whose 
campaign strongly criticized the settlement and who, since taking office, 
has been publicly hostile to the order’s requirements of locating subsidized 
housing in affluent white areas and of the County’s having to take action 
against recalcitrant municipalities.218
Meanwhile, the court–appointed Monitor ordered the County to make 
quarterly reports on a series of issues as part of the Implementation Plan 
called for in the consent order.219 The County’s first such report, filed in 
January 2010, was found unacceptable by the Monitor.220 A revised report 
submitted in March 2010 was also found deficient, with the Monitor 
concluding that it fell “short of a true plan to comply with either the 
[Consent Decree’s] specific terms or its overarching goal of building a more 
integrated Westchester.”221 Some progress was perceived in the County’s 
third iteration, filed in August 2010, but the Monitor still did not find this 
sufficient to accomplish the decree’s terms and objectives.222
Both as part of the consent agreement and in response to the court’s 
ruling that Westchester’s prior AFFH certifications were false, the County 
was obligated to submit a new AI to HUD.223 Westchester submitted a 
proposed AI in July of 2010, after receiving a six–month extension from 
HUD from the December 2009 deadline called for in the settlement 
decree. HUD rejected this proposal in December 2010, finding the 
County’s effort substantially “incomplete and unacceptable because it 
fails to link the information the County presents with a set of sufficiently 
responsive actions.”224 HUD gave Westchester another four months to 
identify these actions, which included “overcoming exclusionary zoning 
practices; addressing location of affordable housing; promoting fair 
housing choice of voucher holders and other lower–income and minority 
households; increasing availability of affordable housing for families with 
Aug. 17, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/18/nyregion/18spano.html.
218 See Op–Ed., Astorino Shirks Housing Duty, Journal News (Westchester, N.Y.), July 17, 
2011, at 14 (responding to press conference held by new County Executive Rob Astorino), 
available at http://www.lohud.com/article/20110717/OPINION/ 107170332/A–Journal–News–
editorial–Astorino–shirks–housing–duty.
219 See Monitor’s Report, note 216, at 2.
220 See id. at 5.
221 See id. at 5; Monitor’s Report Regarding Implementation of the Stipulation & Order 
of Settlement & Dismissal for the Period of February 11, 2010 Through July 6, 2010 at 10, U.S. 
ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548 (No. 06‑2860). 
222 See Monitor’s Report, supra note 216, at 6.
223 For Westchester’s AI obligations pursuant to the consent agreement, which are inde‑
pendent of and supplemental to requirements imposed on the County as a CDBG recipient, 
see Settlement Order, supra note 209, at para. 32.
224 Letter from John D. Trasviña, Assistant Sec’y for HUD, to Kevin Plunkett, Deputy 
Cnty. Exec., Westchester Cnty. (Dec. 21, 2010), available at http://www.prrac.org/pdf/12–21–
2010_HUD_Response_to_Westchester_AI.pdf. 
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children; and combating local opposition to affordable housing.”225 The 
County’s second proposed AI was submitted in April 2011, but HUD again 
found it unacceptable.226
In May 2011, the ADC, the original plaintiff in the litigation, filed a 
motion with the court to intervene and to enforce the settlement order, 
contending that the County’s delays and non–compliance required more 
aggressive action than the Monitor, HUD, and the Justice Department 
were producing.227 According to the ADC’s lawyer, instead of changing 
Westchester’s approach to AFFH during this period, the County was 
“continuing the same attitudes and polices that landed it in trouble in the 
first place.”228
In short, two years of post–settlement activity has shown that Westchester 
has no more appetite for locating affordable housing in its white areas than 
prior to this litigation. Furthermore, this continuing resistance has yielded 
little in the way effective enforcement of the law’s AFFH mandates from 
HUD and the Monitor beyond chastising words.
D. Westchester’s Significance
The Westchester litigation has the potential to energize enforcement of 
§ 3608 and heighten compliance with its AFFH mandates. The fact that 
CDBG funds go to some 1200 jurisdictions – and many more receive 
such funds as members of a consortium like Westchester’s – means that a 
huge number of local governments are by law committed to affirmatively 
furthering fair housing. Furthermore, in the current economic climate, 
these entities can ill afford to put their “entitlement” grants at risk by the 
kind of behavior that Westchester engaged in. The overall dollar amounts 
involved are huge, particularly compared to the relatively small amount 
of federal funding that supports general fair housing enforcement.229 
225 Id.
226 See Letter from John D. Trasviña, Assistant Sec’y for HUD to Kevin Plunkett, Dep‑
uty Cnty. Exec., Westchester Cnty. (May 13, 2011) (on file with author). Shortly thereafter, 
HUD also rejected Westchester’s “Action Plan” and its AFFH certification for FY 2011. See id. 
“The most recent rejection of the County’s AI occurred on July 13, 2011, when HUD rejected 
the County’s June 13 revised AI submission.” United States ex rel. Anti–Discrimination Ctr. v. 
Westchester Cnty., No. 06 Civ. 2860, 2012 WL 13777, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2012).
227 Motion to Intervene ¶ 4, United States ex rel. Anti–Discrimination Ctr. v. Westches‑
ter County, 668 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 06–CV–2860); Motion to Enforce Con‑
sent Decree Pursuant to Consent Decree, ¶ 58 at ¶ 2, Westchester II, 668 F. Supp. 2d 548 (No. 
06–2860). The motion was denied in early 2012. See United States ex rel. Anti–Discrimination Ctr., 
No. 06 Civ. 2860, 2012 WL 13777.
228 See Press Release, Anti–Discrimination Center, Statement on Motions to Enforce 
and to Intervene (June 1, 2011), http://www.antibiaslaw.com/westchester–false–claims–case/
june–1–2011–adc–statement–motions–enforce–and–intervene.
229 For example, since 1989, HUD has had a Fair Housing Initiatives Program (FHIP) 
that supports private fair housing enforcement efforts, but the total amount of HUD’s FHIP 
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Even if one were to assume that many CDBG grantees take their AFFH 
responsibilities seriously – a fact that in itself should encourage more 
integration230 – those, like Westchester, that have ignored the racial aspects 
of these responsibilities are now at least threatened with the potential of 
significant revenue loss.
This is not to say that such recalcitrant grantees all face the kind of 
litigation brought against Westchester. The specific facts of that case 
that supported a False Claims Act charge, particularly its reliance on 
FCA–required non–public information, may exist in only a few situations 
involving CDBG grantees.231 However, while using the FCA to enforce 
§ 3608’s mandates may not often be possible,232 these mandates have 
their own legal bases, which certainly may be enforced by HUD and, in 
some situations, by privately initiated complaints to HUD or otherwise.233 
Westchester’s real significance is that it provided a wake–up call to the federal 
government regarding the fact that its 1200 CDBG grantees could be, and 
should be, required to do what for many years the law has mandated as a 
condition of receiving HUD funds.
At a minimum, these requirements mean that local governments should 
not be allowed to use their land–use and other powers in ways that frustrate 
efforts to provide integrated housing. And yet, for decades, this is precisely 
how many communities behaved. Westchester presumably reminded HUD 
that it has the power to withhold funds from jurisdictions whose actions 
negatively impact minority housing opportunities in white areas. But no 
one should suppose this will be easy. As Westchester’s post–settlement phase 
demonstrates, heavily segregated entitlement jurisdictions are unlikely 
to make significant changes without a fight.234 And they are particularly 
grants has averaged only about $13 million dollars per year. See Kenneth Temkin et al., Study 
of the Fair Housing Initiatives Program at x (2011), available at http://www.huduser.org/
Publications/pdf/FHIP_2011.pdf. Furthermore, federal enforcement of fair housing “has 
been inconsistent and soft” in part because “HUD’s Office of Fair Housing and Equal Op‑
portunity is chronically understaffed, under–funded, and marginalized within the HUD struc‑
ture.” Breymaier, supra note 62, at 247; see also National Fair Housing Report, supra note 
170, at 17 (“HUD has chronically understaffed its fair housing enforcement, and many staff 
are poorly trained and directed about how to accomplish fair housing enforcement.”).
230 See infra notes 274–88 and accompanying text.
231 See supra notes 186–89 and accompanying text; see also Termine, supra note 171, at 
1421–23.
232 But see E–mail from Michael Allen, Partner, Relman, Dane & Colfax, PLLC, to the 
author (Aug. 9, 2011, 11:56 EST) (on file with author) (stating that Mr. Allen, who was one of 
the ADC’s lawyers in the Westchester case, is currently counsel in three other such FCA–AFFH 
cases, all of which are presently under seal, see supra note 184 and accompanying text, and thus 
cannot now be made public).
233 See supra notes 142–66 and accompanying text; infra note 252–65 and accompanying 
text.
234 See Schuck, supra note 177, at 366 (concluding, based on analysis of prior housing 
desegregation cases, that “politically mobilized communities strongly oppose the kinds of 
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unlikely to change unless HUD rouses itself and becomes willing to use 
more than rhetorical flourishes as part of its enforcement arsenal.235
IV. Post–Westchester Developments
A. Privately Initiated Litigation: Court Suits and Complaints to HUD
As noted in the previous section, the potential represented by the 
Westchester precedent is huge in terms of the large number of local 
communities whose participation in the CDBG program require AFFH 
actions and the amount of federal dollars at stake. This remains true even 
though the current Congress has substantially cut CDBG appropriations,236 
for even a lower funding level in the $3 billion per year area would provide 
much needed revenue for local governments whose finances are stressed in 
these difficult economic times.
As important as the leverage provided by the CDBG program continues 
to be, however, the Westchester case’s reliance on the False Claims Acts means 
that its model may be of only limited value as a technique for enforcing § 
3608.237 In 2010, Congress considered, but did not pass, a proposed FHA 
amendment that would have provided for private enforcement of § 3608’s 
mandates.238 Without such an amendment, court enforcement of these 
mandates outside the context of a FCA suit is difficult,239 and such actions 
have not been particularly successful in the post–Westchester era.
For example, in Gallagher v. Magner,240 the Eighth Circuit, in considering 
claims by low–income landlords that the City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 
diversity the courts have mandated”).
235 Termine, supra note 171, at 1392 (“HUD has not ‘developed the enforcement tools 
or the political will to take on the powerful constituent groups, like mayors, governors and 
county executives who are the primary recipients of CDBG’ funds.” (quoting Nat’l Comm’n 
on Fair Hous. & Equal Opportunity, Pub. Hearing at 2 (Sept. 22, 2008) (testimony of Michael 
Allen, Partner, Relman, Dane & Colfax, PLLC))).
236 See HUD, FY2012 Budget Summary 12, 35 (2011) (noting the following Commu‑
nity Development Block Grant budgets per fiscal year: FY 2007 $3.772 billion; FY 2008 $3.866 
billion; FY 2009 $3.900 billion; FY 2010 $4.450 billion; FY 2011 $3.380 billion). 
237 See supra notes 186–89 and accompanying text.
238 Housing Opportunities Made Equal (HOME) Act, H.R. 6500, 111th Cong. § 3(f) 
(2010) (proposing to amend the FHA’s definition of a discriminatory housing practice to in‑
clude “a failure to comply with [§ 3608(e)(5)] or a regulation made to carry out [§ 3608(e)
(5)]”). For an alternative way of amending the FHA to provide for private enforcement of § 
3608 by changing this provision’s language to justify a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, see Collins, supra note 115, at 2183–84.
239 For a discussion of these techniques, see supra notes 82–83, 104, 112–13, 115–16 
and accompanying text.
240 Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 636 
F.3d 380 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011).
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was enforcing its building code more aggressively against them because 
their tenants were predominantly minority, rejected most of the plaintiffs’ 
claims, including one based on § 3608.241 Gallagher held that the § 3608 
claim was subsumed within plaintiffs’ other FHA claims, concluding that 
“the City’s duty to ‘affirmatively further fair housing’ has no independent 
significance” apart from plaintiffs’ other FHA claims.242 Other recent cases 
alleging FHA violations by municipalities also succeeded or failed based 
on the FHA’s other prohibitions, often without even mentioning § 3608.243
Other cases that did include § 3608 claims have, like Gallagher, also not 
relied directly on that provision for whatever success they produced. One 
noteworthy example, Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. HUD,244 
involved HUD funds designed to help parts of Louisiana recover from 
Hurricane Katrina.245 Here, two fair housing groups and five individuals 
241 See id. at 831–33, 838–43. The court did uphold one of the plaintiffs’ claims based on 
the FHA’s § 3604(a) that alleged the defendant’s practices had a disparate impact on minori‑
ties. See id. at 833–38.
242 Id. at 839.
243 See, e.g., Mt. Holly Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mt. Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 381–87 
(3d. Cir. 2011) (upholding minority residents’ impact–based claim that township’s condemna‑
tion of their housing complex violated the FHA’s § 3604(a)); NAACP v. City of Kyle, Tex., 
626 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 2010), aff’g No. A–05–CA–979–LY, 2009 WL 6574497 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 
20, 2009) (rejecting on standing grounds claim based on the FHA’s § 3604(a) that city’s zon‑
ing changes had a disparate impact on minorities); Rivera v. Inc. Vill. of Farmingdale, 2011 
WL 1260209 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2011) (finding sufficient evidence of intentional and impact–
based discrimination to deny defendants’ summary judgment motion in § 3604 claim alleging 
that Hispanic residents of low–income building were targeted by municipal redevelopment 
program); S. Middlesex Opportunity Council, Inc. v. Town of Framingham, 752 F. Supp. 2d 85, 
97–103 (D. Mass. 2010) (upholding claim of intentional discrimination by operator of group 
homes for disabled people based on the FHA’s § 3604(f)(1)); Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. 
Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 749 F. Supp. 2d 486, 498–502 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (holding 
that undisputed evidence established discriminatory impact and inference of discriminatory 
intent by Texas agency’s limiting its approval of low–income housing projects in Dallas to mi‑
nority neighborhoods in violation of § 3604(a) and § 3605(a)); United States v. Town of Garner, 
N.C., 720 F. Supp. 2d 721 (E.D.N.C. 2010) (upholding claims on behalf of group home based 
on the FHA’s “reasonable accommodation” provision in § 3604(f)(3)(B)); Williams v. City of 
Antioch, No. C 08–02301, 2010 WL 3632197 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2010) (certifying class action 
in FHA–based case alleging city’s harassment of black Section 8 tenants).
244 Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 
639 F.3d 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2011) [hereinafter Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. II].
245 For more on cases involving Katrina–related HUD funds and § 3608, see infra notes 
254–56 and accompanying text. Such funds were also involved in Mississippi State Confer‑
ence NAACP v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, 677 F. Supp. 
2d 311 (D.D.C. 2010), dismissed pending appeal, 2010 WL 4629468 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 16, 2010), 
where the NAACP and other private parties accused HUD of violating the CDBG statute, 
but not § 3608, in allowing the State of Mississippi to improperly divert some $570 million in 
CDBG funds away from low–income housing to expand commercial areas of Gulfport. The 
district court dismissed the case on standing grounds, id. at 313–14, and while the plaintiffs’ 
appeal was pending, HUD and the state agreed to a settlement. See Recent Settlements, Fair 
Housing–Fair Lending, Dec. 1, 2010, at 11 (describing $132 million settlement designed to 
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sued HUD and the state, alleging that Louisiana’s formula for distributing 
its special Katrina–related CDBG funds negatively impacted minority 
homeowners in New Orleans. The plaintiffs initially claimed that this 
violated the FHA’s § 3604(a), § 3605(a), and § 3608,246 but only their § 
3604(a) claim survived.247 The district court entered a limited preliminary 
injunction in favor of the plaintiffs,248 but the D.C. Circuit reversed, 
holding that they had failed to prove a negative racial impact in violation of 
§ 3604(a).249 The parties then reached a settlement in mid–2011.250 
This case, though impressive in terms of the ultimate relief obtained 
and the possible value of a lurking § 3608 claim, makes clear that the key 
to current enforcement of § 3608’s mandates lies with HUD, either through 
action prompted by a lawsuit, a privately initiated administrative complaint 
to HUD under the FHA,251 or on HUD’s own initiative. With respect to 
administrative complaints, fourteen privately initiated § 3608–based claims 
were pending as of April 2011.252 Some of the more noteworthy included253:
assist relocation of hurricane–displaced families).
246 Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. II, 639 F.3d at 1081; Greater New Orleans 
Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 723 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 n.6 (D.D.C. 
2010) [hereinafter Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. I] (listing, in trial court’s initial 
decision, these three bases for plaintiffs’ claims).
247 See Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. I, 723 F. Supp. 2d 21–24 (dismissing 
claims based on § 3605(a) and § 3608 after upholding § 3604(a) claim); see also Greater New 
Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. II, 639 F.3d at 1079 (citing only § 3604(a)).
248 Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr.I, 723 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2010), rev’d, 
639 F.3d 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
249 Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. II, 639 F.3d at 1085–89. Only the state ap‑
pealed, while HUD, though a defendant and subject to the district court’s injunction, took no 
part in the appeal. Id. at 1080. 
250 Michael A. Fletcher, HUD to Pay $62 Million to La. Homeowners to Settle Road Home 
Lawsuit, Wash. Post, July 6, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/hud–
to–pay–62–million–to–la–homeowners–to–settle–road–home–lawsuit/2011/07/06/gIQAts‑
FN1H_story.html (reporting settlement in which HUD would pay “as much as $62 million 
to 1,300 Louisiana homeowners” on top of “changes the Obama administration and state of 
Louisiana made in the program nearly two years ago that allowed more than 13,300 low– and 
moderate–income homeowners to receive $470 million in grants to supplement the initial 
rewards they received from the rebuilding program”)
251 See supra note 119 (describing the FHA’s provision for administrative complaints to 
HUD).
252 E–mail from Sara Pratt, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Enforcement and Programs, Of‑
fice of Fair Hous. and Equal Opportunity, HUD, to author (Sept. 27, 2011, 9:08 A.M.) (on file 
with author).
253 In addition to the cases described in the text, other complaints filed with HUD in‑
clude one against Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, and one against Atlanta, Georgia. E–mail from 
Michael Allen, Partner, Relman, Dane & Colfax, PLLC, to the author (Aug. 9, 2011, 11:56 
EST) (on file with author); see also Jennifer Medina, Subsidies and Suspicion: Seeking a Bet-
ter Life, California Renters Encounter Resistance, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 2011, at A12 (describing 
private lawsuit accusing the California cities of Lancaster and Palmdale of harassing Section 
8 tenants on racial grounds and reporting that HUD “notified Lancaster last month that it 
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In Texas in late 2009, two private fair housing groups filed a complaint 
challenging the state’s plan for distributing some $1.7 billion in Katrina–
related CDBG funds, alleging that Texas engaged in race and national 
origin discrimination in violation of the FHA’s § 3604(a) and § 3604(b) 
and also failed to AFFH by not analyzing the fair housing impact of 
the state’s plan for use of these funds.254 More particularly, the state’s 
allocating HUD funds to certain east Texas jurisdictions with a history 
of resistance to racial integration in housing allegedly was resulting in 
discrimination and increased segregation. This case was resolved in May 
of 2010 in a settlement agreement that called for HUD to release these 
CDBG funds in exchange for various concessions by Texas, including 
that the state would re–allocate the funds to affirmatively further fair 
housing and would produce an updated AI for public comment and 
approval.255
HUD’s Katrina–related grants were also involved in a 2010 complaint 
filed against the State of Louisiana based on discriminatory actions by 
one of that state’s subgrantees, the virtually all–white St. Bernard Parish, 
in blocking affordable housing. On March 17, 2011, HUD threatened 
to cut funds to the state unless it made St. Bernard comply with the 
FHA, noting that the Parish government had acted to keep out African–
Americans by restricting rental housing in defiance of numerous court 
rulings finding civil rights violations and the “State remains responsible 
to assure that St. Bernard Parish complies” with CDBG requirements.256
In Illinois, the City of Danville was accused of racial and disability 
discrimination in the operation of its public housing and housing 
voucher programs in violation of the FHA’s § 3604(a) and § 3604(b) and 
also of failing to AFFH by repeatedly certifying it had conducted an AI 
when it had not done so and was in fact promoting policies that had the 
effect of discriminating and perpetuating segregation.257 In a separate 
action, the City of Joliet, having been embroiled in long–standing 
litigation accusing it of using its eminent domain power to destroy a 
HUD–subsidized, predominantly black housing complex for racial 
reasons, was the target of a complaint to HUD, which resulted in HUD’s 
would investigate the accusations” and the city “could lose hundreds of thousands of dollars 
in federal grants”).
254 Texas Will Improve Compliance with Duty to Affirmatively Further Fair Housing, Fair 
Housing–Fair Lending, June 1, 2010, at 3 (reporting settlement in Texas Low–Income Housing 
Information Service v. State of Texas, No. 06–10–0410–8 (HUD May 25, 2010), ftp://ftp.tdhca.
state.tx.us/pub/dr–files/AppendixA.pdf, which provided for Texas to update its AI and docu‑
ment how its municipal subgrantees were meeting their AFFH obligations, use $152 million 
for low– and moderate–income housing, set aside $100 million to rebuild subsidized housing 
in three counties, and provide up to $5 million for relocation of tenants with rental subsidies). 
255 See id.; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., HUD Applauds Revised 
$1.7 Billion Texas Disaster Plan (May 25, 2010) (providing a link to the settlement agreement 
and describing the “extensive relief” called for therein), available at http://portal.hud.gov:80/
hudportal/HUD?src=/press/press_releases_media_advisories/2010/HUDNo.10–106. 
256 See Letter from Mercedes M. Márquez, HUD Assistant Sec’y for Cmty. Planning & 
Dev., to Paul W. Rainwater, Comm’r of Admin., La. Office of Cmty. Dev. (Mar. 17, 2011) (on 
file with author); see also Complaint, Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. Louisi‑
ana, No. 061012618 (HUD Jan. 28, 2011) (private complaint filed with HUD) (on file with 
author).  In early 2011, HUD initiated its own FHA complaint against St. Bernard Parish. See 
Complaint, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. St. Bernard Parish, No. 00–11–0024–8 (HUD 
Jan. 28, 2011) (on file with author). 
257 Recent Complaints, Fair Housing–Fair Lending, Dec. 1, 2010, at 11 (reporting the 
filing of Chambers v. City of Danville).
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threat to withhold the City’s CDBG funds.258
In Wisconsin, a private fair housing organization alleged in a 2011 
complaint that Waukesha County, which covers Milwaukee’s western 
suburbs and receives some $2.5 million in CDBG and other HUD 
funds, failed to comply with its AFFH duties by allowing its constituent 
communities to use their land use powers to block affordable housing 
on racial grounds.259
In Delaware, Sussex County was accused by a private organization 
in late 2010 of blocking a proposed housing development for low– 
and moderate–income people based on race and national origin 
discrimination and of disregarding its AFFH responsibilities.260
In California, a fair housing organization alleged that Marin County 
failed to promote access to affordable housing for minorities and 
persons with disabilities as part of its general AFFH responsibilities. 
HUD investigated and offered the County a Voluntary Compliance 
Agreement in late 2010 that resulted in the County’s undertaking to 
produce a new AI with public input.261 
These cases represent an unprecedented effort to use § 3608 as a way of 
enforcing the FHA’s basic substantive provisions against local governments 
and encouraging these governments to take a more aggressive role in 
promoting residential integration. Still, such individual cases are, by 
definition, limited to a few specific geographic areas. For § 3608–based 
efforts to have a nationwide impact requires more general action by 
HUD and by the CDBG grantees themselves, topics that are dealt with, 
respectively, in the next two sections.
B. HUD–Initiated Actions
258 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Sues City of Joliet to Preserve 
Affordable Housing for Low–Income Residents, Mostly African–American (Aug. 4, 2011) (de‑
scribing HUD–referred suit alleging that Joliet’s attempted condemnation of this complex 
violates the FHA), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2011/pr0804_02.
pdf. Some of the background litigation is reflected in New West, L.P. v. City of Joliet, 491 F.3d 
717 (7th Cir. 2007), and City of Joliet v. New West, L.P., 562 F.3d 830 (7th Cir. 2009).
259 Recent Filings, Fair Housing–Fair Lending , May 1, 2011, at 9 (reporting on Metropol-
itan Milwaukee Fair Housing Council v. Waukesha County); see also MSP Real Estate, Inc. v. City 
of New Berlin, Nos. 11–C–281, 11–C–608, 2011 WL 3047681 (E.D. Wis. 2011) (alleging that 
defendant, a Waukesha County suburb of Milwaukee, blocked a proposed affordable hous‑
ing development based on racial hostility in violation of the FHA’s § 3604(a) and § 3617); see 
also Complaint, United States v. City of New Berlin, No. 2:11–CV–00608 (E.D. Wis. June 23, 
2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/documents/newberlincomp.pdf; Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Files Lawsuit Against City of New Berlin, 
Wisconsin, for Blocking Affordable Housing (June 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.
gov/opa/pr/2011/June/11–crt–831.html. 
260 Recent Filings, Fair Housing–Fair Lending, Jan. 1, 2011, at 9 (reporting on Diamond 
State Community Land Trust of Dover v. Sussex County).
261 Id.; see also Aaron Glantz, Marin Officials Tepid on Diversity Plan, Bay Area Citizen, 
Mar. 29, 2011 (describing the settlement and post–settlement events), http://www.bayciti‑
zen.org/housing/story/marin–officials–tepid–diversity–plan/2/. Marin’s draft AI is available 
at www.marincdbg.com.
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Whether Westchester’s promise is fulfilled depends largely on how HUD 
responds to this new environment, both with respect to its duty to require 
individual grantees to more effectively meet their AFFH obligations and 
in its establishing general standards that are better designed to result in 
more compliance with these obligations than has been the norm in the past 
four decades. On these matters, in the time since the Westchester settlement, 
HUD’s record has been mixed.
1. Individual Enforcement.—Besides HUD’s roles as a co–defendant 
in § 3608 cases and an investigator/prosecutor of the § 3608–based 
administrative claims brought to it,262 HUD is responsible for reviewing the 
more than 1200 CDBG grantees’ certifications that they will AFFH, which 
includes their AIs. For HUD to take this work seriously – as it seems not to 
have done for much of the past two decades during which AIs have been 
a crucial part of the AFFH certification process263 – will require a much 
greater commitment and effort.
 HUD’s current strategy for doing this job is to enhance its staff size 
and training while conducting targeted reviews of grantees’ AFFH–related 
submissions.264 The results of this effort are yet to be known.
2. New Regulations and Guidance.—In 2009, HUD began a review of its 
existing AFFH regulations. In January 2010, a senior HUD official told 
Congress that “the department was working on a proposed regulation to 
enhance AFFH compliance.”265 A tentative time frame for proposing this 
rule was given as December of 2010,266 but HUD has not yet produced 
such a rule.267
Features of a new regulation would presumably include “enhancements 
262 See supra Part IV.A.
263 See supra Part II.C.
264 See GAO Report, supra note 134, at 46–47 (publishing Letter from John Trasviña, 
Assistant Sec’y for Fair Hous. & Equal Opportunity, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., to 
Orice Williams, Fin. Mkts. & Cmty. Invs. Dir., Gov’t Accounting Office (Sept. 3, 2010)) (not‑
ing HUD’s staff enhancement and training regarding AFFH and that HUD in FY2010 “has 
reviewed the AIs of more than 300 recipient jurisdictions” (emphasis in original)); see also E–mail 
from Sara Pratt, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Enforcement & Programs, Office of Fair Hous. 
& Equal Opportunity, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., to author (January 18, 2011, 10:04 
EST) (noting strategy of conducting targeted AFFH reviews) (on file with author).
265 GAO Report, supra note 134, at 29–30 (quoting Trasviña Statement, supra note 211).
266 Id. at 30.
267 Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, Regin‑
fo.gov (Spring 2011), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule? pubId= 
201104&RIN=2501–AD33 (listing a proposed AFFH regulation as having an aspirational tar‑
get date of December 2011, which means it is not likely to be published until sometime in 
2012). 
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to the guidance provided to grantees on preparing AIs and improvements 
in [HUD]’s oversight and enforcement approaches.”268 A new regulation 
might also include “standards for grantees to follow in updating their 
AIs and the format that they should follow in preparing the [necessary] 
documents . . . [and] require, at a minimum, that grantees submit their AIs 
to the department on a routine basis to help ensure grantees compliance 
with requirements and guidance pertaining to these documents.”269 While 
HUD has cited its own staffing limitations as a barrier to better AFFH 
compliance,270 a number of regulatory improvements could be made 
without “additional staff resources[, such as] requiring grantees to submit 
their AIs for review, without necessarily approving them, [which] would 
allow [HUD] officials to perform a variety of basic tasks to better ensure 
their quality.”271
As the GAO noted in September 2010: “In the absence of such regulatory 
requirements, the usefulness of requiring AIs as a tool to affirmatively 
further fair housing is diminished.”272 Now, well over a year later with still 
no proposed rule, HUD’s record in this phase of the post–Westchester era is 
not encouraging. 
C. Grantees’ Positive Responses; What a “Good” AI Would Include
The response of the hundreds of CDBG grantees to the AFFH 
requirements set forth by HUD, first in 1988 and then again in the mid–
1990s,273 has ranged from indifference bordering on hostility (as illustrated 
by Westchester County) to legitimate, even creative, efforts to meet 
268 GAO Report, supra note 134, at 30.
269 Id. at 34; see also Collins, supra note 115, at 2181 (“Fair housing advocates have ac‑
tively submitted recommendations for reforming the current regulations, [] which generally 
focus on strengthening the definition of affirmatively further fair housing, [] increasing grant‑
ees’ accountability, [] and enabling public participation in grantees’ formulation of plans and 
in maintaining compliance.”).
270 See GAO Report, supra note 134, at 30, 46–47.
271 Id. at 30–31.
These tasks could include verifying whether AIs (1) have been prepared as re‑
quired, (2) updated in accordance with HUD guidance, (3) include all elements 
suggested in the 1996 fair housing guidance, and (4) are consistent with AFFH 
discussions in other key documents.
Id. at 31. There is a downside to having HUD take on the responsibility of reviewing and 
approving every AI. “That is logistically impossible, and would result in a ‘low bar’ for compli‑
ance. If HUD audited a percentage of AIs (like the IRS audits a percentage of tax returns), I 
think state and municipal grantees would take the matter much more seriously.” E–mail from 
Michael Allen, Partner, Relman, Dane & Colfax, PLLC, to author (Sept. 2, 2011, 10:44 EST) 
(discussing his perspective as one of the plaintiff’s lawyers in the Westchester litigation) (on file 
with author).
272 GAO Report, supra note 134, at 34.
273 See supra notes 125–28 and accompanying text (1988); supra Part III.C.2 (mid–1990s).
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these requirements.274 Grantees in the latter category have, over time, 
produced some serious and thoughtful AIs, updated them regularly, and, 
as also required by HUD’s regulations, taken actions to overcome the 
impediments to fair housing identified in their AIs and kept records of 
these efforts.275 As a result, there is now a substantial body of materials that 
can provide a general blueprint for grantees’ proper AFFH performance, 
which should prove important both in HUD’s evaluation of an individual 
grantee’s performance (as mentioned in the previous section) and for once–
reluctant grantees that now want to do better, either out of a genuine desire 
to obey the law or as a result of having been “encouraged” along this path 
through litigation or the threat of lost funding.
The experiences of such grantees yield a sense of what a CDBG 
entitlement community should do to conduct a proper AI as part of its 
duty to AFFH. A proper AI would provide data and analysis with respect 
to at least four elements in the relevant geographic area: (1) the degree 
of residential segregation; (2) the location of affordable housing and the 
availability of Section 8 and other HUD–assisted programs for lower income 
persons; (3) the degree and nature of FHA–prohibited discrimination; 
and (4) plans for addressing the impediments to fair housing shown by 
the first three elements.276 Furthermore, the process used to produce an 
274 According to AFFH–advocates, communities that have done a good job in con‑
ducting their AIs including Toledo and Bowling Green, Ohio, see Toledo Fair Hous. Ctr., 
Analysis of Impediments, Fair Hous. Center, (on file with author), and Naperville, Illinois, and 
Murfreesboro, Tennessee, see E–mail from Michael Allen, Partner, Relman, Dane & Colfax, 
PLLC, to author (Mar. 31, 2011, 10:19 A.M.) (on file with author).
Other jurisdictions that are just now becoming aware of the importance of conducting 
a good AI and whose experience is worth noting include Marin County, California, see supra 
note 261, and New Orleans, Louisiana, see Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. & 
Lawyers’ Comm’n for Civil Rights Under Law, Strategies to Affirmatively Further Fair 
Housing (2011), available at http://www.lawyerscommittee.org/admin/community_develop‑
ment/documents/files/4–28–11_Strategies_to_Affirmatively_Further_Fair_Housing.pdf.
275 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
276 All of this should be done not only with a focus on race, as the district court in West-
chester held, see supra notes 193–94 and accompanying text, but also, as HUD’s regulations 
require, with respect to all of the FHA’s prohibited bases of discrimination, i.e., race, color, 
national origin, religion, sex, familial status, and handicap (disability). See supra note 162 and 
accompanying text.
For example, various types of disability discrimination might be identified in AIs (e.g., 
multifamily residences constructed without FHA–mandated accessibility features and mu‑
nicipal restrictions on group homes for people with disabilities), see generally Schwemm, supra 
note 4, at §§ 11D:5, 11D:9, particularly since local governments can play a helpful role in 
curbing such discrimination. See D.C. Advisory Comm. to the U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, 
Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing in the District of Columbia: Briefing Report 
(2011) [hereinafter DC–AFFH Report] (calling for the District of Columbia to improve its 
AFFH program by, inter alia, conducting “accessibility surveys of new multifamily housing 
covered by the Fair Housing Act”), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/07–13–11_DC‑
SAC.pdf.
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AI (e.g., providing for appropriate opportunities for public engagement) is 
important.
With respect to the first element (segregation), the data available from 
the most recent census should be provided, broken down by individual 
neighborhood, census track, or zip code within the grantee’s jurisdiction, and 
compared with similar prior data to determine whether racial concentration 
is growing or diminishing. The resulting measures of segregation – or, put 
more positively, diversity – should be compared to appropriate benchmarks, 
such as the overall racial mix of the grantee’s entire metropolitan statistical 
area (“MSA”). To the extent that a particular community’s segregation 
measure is worse than the overall MSA’s, the plans called for in Element (4) 
should include specific proposals for improving this measure, with specific 
goals and time frames so that the effectiveness of these proposals can be 
assessed periodically (i.e., at least every two years).
A similar analysis should be provided with respect to Element 2 (the 
location of affordable housing and available housing programs). The 
information here should show the racial make–up of the beneficiaries 
of such programs in the grantee’s area and where these beneficiaries 
currently live, along with an analysis of how this information relates to the 
segregation data provided in Element (1).277 To the extent this element 
shows that affordable housing or other subsidized housing opportunities 
are disproportionately located in minority census tracts within the 
grantee’s jurisdiction, Element (4) should include specific plans, again with 
timetables, for locating a minimum portion (e.g., 75%) of such new units 
and opportunities in non–minority areas. 
Element 3 requires a method for determining the degree and types of 
unlawful housing discrimination in the area. One basis for this would be 
statistics from HUD, state, and/or local fair housing agencies on the number 
of FHA complaints received. Another technique, already adopted in some 
grantees’ AIs, would be to require periodic testing programs conducted by 
a private fair housing group or other proper subcontractor.278 
Obviously, and perhaps most importantly, Element (3) should identify 
not only discrimination carried out by private actors, but also that alleged to 
have been engaged in by the grantee itself and/or other local governments 
within the grantee’s consortium. By way of response, the Element (4) 
277 See DC–AFFH Report, supra note 276, at 9 (calling for the District of Columbia to 
improve its AFFH program by, inter alia, providing various additional information and services 
to Section 8 voucher holders).
278 See id. (calling for the District of Columbia to improve its AFFH program by, inter 
alia, undertaking “routine testing to identify discrimination in rental, sales, homeowners’ in‑
surance, steering . . . , and access to Section 8”).
The discrimination identified here might include that relating to home financing as well 
as sales and rentals. See id. (calling for the District of Columbia to improve its AFFH program 
by, inter alia, increasing “oversight of lenders by examining location of branches and services 
offered and . . . examin[ing] lenders’ portfolios for evidence of discrimination”).
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plans should include specific ways that the grantee intends to modify 
its problematic land–use and other policies, along with a more general 
determination of how discrimination complaints can be better dealt with, 
either through a state or local fair housing agency or a private fair housing 
organization. These agencies need to be fully funded and well functioning, 
so that their investigations and remedial efforts are prompt and effective.
Fair housing activities need to include educational as well as 
enforcement efforts, with the former ranging from simply placing fair 
housing messages in public areas like buses and shelters to providing 
materials and conducting meetings that explain the benefits of a diverse 
society and integrated neighborhoods.279 Another important educational 
goal that might help in dispersing affordable housing would be to change 
the negative, stereotyped image of this housing, so that it is more positively 
viewed as being for lower income workers, such as:
teachers, firemen, and people who work at the local grocery store. In 
essence, they are part of the community. . . . “You have to plant the seeds 
of productive, viable, American citizens paying taxes. That gives them 
an opportunity, instead of saying, ‘Oh no, we can’t do that because it’s 
going to bring in city folk who don’t have the income or who don’t have 
the same values that I believe I have.’”280 
 
As for Element (4), the plans, in addition to those items already identified, 
should include for each grantee like Westchester County with subgrantees 
that the latter be required to submit yearly plans that are consistent with 
the grantee’s AI and address fair housing issues at the subgrantees’ level.281
The process by which all of this is done, particularly providing for input 
from various constituencies, is also important. Ever since 1995, HUD’s 
regulations have provided detailed requirements for citizen participation 
in the creation of a grantee’s Consolidated Plan,282 which is the overriding 
document that includes the grantee’s AFFH certification.283 In describing 
279 See Breymaier, supra note 62, at 251 (calling for such activities).
280 Kelly L. Patterson & Robert Mark Silverman, How Local Public Administrators, Non-
profit Providers, and Elected Officials Perceive Impediments to Fair Housing in the Suburbs: An Analy-
sis of Erie County, New York, 21 Housing Pol’y Debate 165, 179–80 (2011) (quoting focus group 
member).
281 E–mail from Rob Breymaier, Exec. Dir., Oak Park Reg’l Hous. Ctr. to author (Oct. 
20, 2010, 11:03 CST) (on file with author).
282 See 24 C.F.R. § 91.100 (2011) (requiring each entitlement jurisdiction to “consult 
with other public and private agencies that provide assisted housing, health services, and 
social and fair housing services” in preparing its consolidated plan); 24 C.F.R. § 91.105 (2011) 
(requiring each such jurisdiction “to adopt a citizen participation plan that sets forth the ju‑
risdiction’s policies and procedures for citizen participation” that must “provide for and en‑
courage citizens to participate in the development of the consolidated plan” and that “affords 
citizens, public agencies, and other interested parties a reasonable opportunity to examine 
[the plan’s] contents and to submit comments”); see also 24 C.F.R. §§ 91.110, 91.115 (2011) 
(same for state grantees); 24 C.F.R. § 91.401 (2011) (same for consortia grantees).
283 See supra notes 156 and accompanying text.
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the AI process, HUD’s Fair Housing Planning Guide has made clear since 
1996 that this process should include a “continuous exchange of concerns, 
ideas, analysis, and evaluation of results” from “all elements of the 
community” and that this should be accomplished “through focus groups, 
an advisory commission, town meetings, or other effective means.”284 
Among other things, this process should result in the involvement of 
various types of people and groups in the creation of their jurisdiction’s AI, 
including fair housing advocates and grassroots community groups.285 Not 
the least important of such groups is middle–class whites.286
Much of this has been known, and indeed called for, since 1996 when 
HUD first published its Fair Housing Planning Guide to help CDBG 
grantees meet their AFFH obligations.287 And to those who resist it as 
“social engineering,” HUD Secretary Donovan’s response is noteworthy:
[F]ighting segregation [isn’t] social engineering. Segregation was 
created by social engineering . . . [such as] by zoning codes that shut 
low– and moderate–income families out of certain markets[;] by funding 
decisions that steer the development of affordable housing away from 
neighborhoods of high opportunity[; and] by federal dollars being 
284 1996 HUD Guide, supra note 155, at 2–12.
285 See Breymaier, supra note 62, at 248 (“[I]nstitutional structures” found to be crucial 
in most stable, diverse communities “are community organizations specifically developed to 
promote the community as racially and ethnically diverse” (quoting Philip Nyden et al., Chap-
ter 1: Neighborhood Racial and Ethnic Diversity in U.S. Cities, 4 Cityscape: J. Pol’y. Dev. & Res., 
no. 2, 1998, at 1, 9, available at http://www.huduser.org/Periodicals/CITYSCPE/ VOL4NUM2/
ch1.pdf)); see also Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Grassroots Consensus Building and Collaborative Planning, 
3 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y. 709, 738 (2000) (“[W]e will continue to win [FHA] litigation battles, 
but still risk losing the war[, unless we] expand our campaign to include more of the tradi‑
tional methods of winning public opinion.” (quoting Michael Allen, The Limits of the Law, in 
The Nimby Rep. 6 (1999))).
286 As one integration advocate has pointed out:
To me, a tremendous benefit of affirmative furthering is that it can be framed in a 
way that aspires to American ideals and promotes a sense of working together. In 
other words, it includes middle class white people by appealing to their sense of 
fairness and actively seeking their participation. . . . Without whites[’] willingness 
to be involved in the affirmative furthering of fair housing, [a jurisdiction might] 
be a diverse but highly segregated community at best. All the research I’ve done 
demonstrates that the lack of white participation, whether as seekers or providers 
of housing, is certainly the greatest impediment to fair housing and integration. 
. . . [T]he avoidance of engaging in fair housing activity by white (and in many 
cases non–black minority) housing seekers, housing developers, real estate profes‑
sionals, landlords, public officials, and community organizations has created and 
sustained a structure of segregation that has failed to be addressed outside of a 
very small number of communities. So, I’ve been concentrating on ways to engage 
whites and provide reasons for them to participate in fair housing activity. . . . I 
would suggest a focus on structural and proactive actions and outcomes that incentiv‑
ize (or force in some cases) the white establishment to participate in fair housing 
while trying our best not to undermine communities of color.
E–mail from Robert Breymaier, Exec. Dir., Oak Park Reg’l Hous. Ctr., to author (Oct. 20, 
2010, 11:03 CST) (on file with author); see also Salsich, supra note 285, at 738 (“We need to 
speak honestly about community integration and inclusion of people who are poor, homeless, 
or who have disabilities. And we need to listen honestly to the concerns of people who oppose 
inclusion.”).
287 See 1996 HUD Guide, supra note 155.
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directed away from the families who need them to rebuild in the 
wake of disaster. Far more often than not, segregation, isolation and 
poverty don’t occur in spite of government. They happen because of 
government—by government dollars and government decisions made 
with government authority.288 
Clearly, “[l]eadership is a critical ingredient” if the FHA’s goal of AFFH 
is to be met,289 not only by HUD but also at the grassroots level. If racism, 
exclusion, and segregation are learned attitudes, then equality, inclusion, 
and integration can also be learned.290
Conclusion
One of the key goals of the 1968 Fair Housing Act was to break the 
grip of segregated housing patterns, both as a way for providing more 
opportunities for minorities and in recognition that all Americans ultimately 
benefit from integrated communities. Failure to accomplish the FHA’s 
integration goal is one of the great civil rights disappointments of the 
past generation. A major cause of segregation continues to be high levels 
of illegal discrimination, perhaps most significantly as practiced by local 
governments whose land–use and other policies have often had the effect, 
if not the outright purpose, of excluding housing opportunities for a more 
diverse population.
The FHA’s § 3608 requires the federal government to administer its 
housing programs in a way that promotes residential integration. The 
FHA’s proponents were well aware of the role governments had played in 
creating and maintaining segregated housing patterns, and, by mandating 
in § 3608 that HUD funds “affirmatively further fair housing,” they clearly 
intended to provide for a more aggressive approach to reverse this behavior. 
For decades, however, § 3608’s commands have been ignored. Local 
governments regularly failed to act according to the AFFH mandate, and 
HUD rarely responded with disapproval, much less forceful action. Private 
§ 3608–based litigation produced some strong judicial decisions, but these 
occasional suits were subject to numerous limitations and did not result in 
widespread enforcement.
All of this could change as a result of a recent suit against Westchester 
County, New York, a wealthy suburban area whose minority population is 
confined to a few discrete areas. As a recipient of federal CDBG funds, 
Westchester has long been required to AFFH, but it never considered 
racial integration to be a part of this requirement. Federal dollars continued 
to flow into Westchester’s many all–white communities without HUD’s 
288 Shaun Donovan, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Commencement Address 
at Southern University at New Orleans (May 7, 2011), available at http://portal.hud.gov/
hudportal/HUD?src=/press/speeches_remarks _statements/2011/Speech_05072011.
289 Patterson & Silverman, supra note 280, at 180.
290 Id. 
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apparent interest or concern until a private fair housing organization brought 
suit, alleging a violation of the False Claims Act. With the coming of the 
Obama Administration, HUD and the Justice Department intervened and 
engineered a promising settlement, although Westchester’s compliance 
with the settlement order’s AFFH requirements remains a matter of 
dispute.
The Westchester litigation has altered the fair housing landscape, making 
serious, nationwide enforcement of § 3608’s AFFH commands a real 
possibility. At the least, this has created a potentially strong new weapon 
in litigation that challenges exclusionary land–use and other segregative 
policies by local governments.
The question remains, however, whether the political will exists to 
support such enforcement. At the local level, substantial resistance is likely, 
particularly if local civil rights and community–based organizations fail to 
provide a counter–weight to entrenched interests. On the national level, 
much depends on HUD, an agency whose civil rights record has been timid 
at best and which has often viewed its main stakeholders as the very local–
government grantees whose exclusionary policies must be changed.291 
Furthermore, local and national elections in 2010 tended to favor those 
seeking a smaller federal role and more autonomy for local jurisdictions, 
particularly in suburban areas where Republicans are strong. One result is 
that the current Congress has greatly reduced the CDBG funding on which 
§ 3608’s AFFH commands largely depend, and has also shown no interest 
in a proposed FHA amendment to authorize private enforcement of § 3608. 
Even if Republicans fail to capture the White House in 2012, the past two 
years show that a Democratic administration hardly guarantees that the 
Westchester–enhanced view of § 3608 enforcement will result in substantial 
change.
Regardless of how the political winds may blow, the need today is 
exactly the same as Dr. King called for nearly 50 years ago—an effective 
anti–segregation “action program.”292
291 See National Fair Housing Report, supra note 170, at 19 (calling for HUD’s fair 
housing responsibilities to be transferred to a new independent agency).
292 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
